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PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT DESIGN
Robert E. Scott* and George G. Triantis**
ABSTRACT
Economic contract theory postulates two obstacles to complete contracts: high
transaction costs and high enforcement (or verification) costs. The literature has proposed how
parties might solve these problems under a stylized litigation system, but it does not address the
question of how parties design contracts under the existing adversarial system, that relies on the
parties to establish relevant facts indirectly by the use of evidentiary proxies. We advance a
theory of contract design in a world of costly litigation. We examine the efficiency of investment
at the front-end and back-end of the contracting process, where we focus on litigation as the
back-end stage. In deciding whether to express their obligations in specific or vague terms,
contracting parties implicitly choose their allocation of costs between the front- and back-end.
When the parties agree to vague terms (or standards), such as best efforts or commercial
reasonableness, they delegate to the back-end the task of selecting proxies: e.g., the court
selects market indicators that serve as benchmarks for performance. When the parties agree to
specific terms(or rules), they invest more at the front-end to specify proxies in their contract and
thereby leaving a smaller task for the enforcing court. In this Article, we explore the choice
between rules and standards in terms of this tradeoff, and offer an explanation for why contracts
in practice have a mix of vague and specific provisions. We then suggest that parties can
achieve further contracting gains by varying procedural rules governing the prospective
enforcement of their disputes. We illustrate by examining provisions in commercial contracts
that allocate burdens and standards of proof. If the parties can improve the cost-effectiveness of
litigation in this manner, they can reduce back-end costs. They thereby create opportunities to
further lower contracting costs (or to improve the incentive gains from contracting) by shifting
more investment to the back-end by increasing their use of vague terms. Vague terms have
fallen into disfavor with contract theorists and this Article offers a justification for why they are
nevertheless commonplace in commercial practice. Our analysis highlights the general and
valuable lesson that the anticipated path of litigation is relevant to contract design.
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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, spurred by theoretical developments in the economics of contracting,
contract law scholars have focused attention on the problems of incomplete contracting: what
prevents parties from writing complete contracts that achieve the dual objectives of efficient
reliance and efficient trade?1 Contract theorists have identified two primary reasons why parties
may agree to contracts that fail to provide for the optimal obligations in each contingency, or
state of the world, that might materialize during the term of the contract.2 First, the front-end
transaction cost of writing such a complete contingent contract may exceed any resulting gains in
contractual surplus. For example, the parties may not foresee all future states of the world, or
they may not calculate the efficient outcome in each state, or they may not wish to incur the
contracting costs of providing specifically for low-probability states.3 Second, the back-end
costs of enforcing contracts may exceed any gains, owing to the difficulty of observing and
verifying to a court private information known only to the parties.4

1

Parties trade efficiently when the value of the exchanged performance to the buyer exceeds the cost of
performance to the seller; parties rely (or invest) efficiently when their actions maximize a contract’s expected
surplus. See, e.g., Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE
L.J. 541, 545 (2003)
2

Note that a contract may be obligationally complete even though it is informationally incomplete. An
obligationally complete contract might lump together various states and provide for the same obligations across the
states of each lumped set. Yet, such a contract is informationally incomplete because it fails to discriminate within
each set between states of the world that optimally call for different obligations. States of the world reflect both
exogenous and endogenous variables. For example, different oil prices produce different states, but so does the
decision of a seller to tender or not. Each event changes the state of the world and may be paired in the contract with
a different obligation on the buyer.
3

E.g., Alan Schwartz, Incomplete Contracts, 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE
LAW 277-283 (P. Newman, ed.1998). See also sources cited in notes 16& 17 infra.
4

A nonverifiable factor is one for which the information cost at trial outweighs the incentive benefit of the
related contractual provision. The paradigmatic example in agency contracts is a contract that requires a minimum
level of effort from the agent, where a third party (such as a court) cannot observe directly how hard the agent is
working. Economists postulate that parties will not contract on factors that are nonverifiable. E.g., Oliver Hart and
John Moore, Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation, 56 ECONOMETRICA 755 (1988); Ilya Segal, Complexity and
Renegotiation: A Foundation for Incomplete Contracts, 66 REV. ECON. STUD. 57, 72-3 (1999). Many legal scholars
have adopted this premise as well. E.g., Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of
Incomplete Agreements and Judicial Strategies, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 271 (1992); Eric Posner, Economic Analysis of
Contract Law After Three Decades: Success or Failure? 112 YALE L.J. 829, 857 (2003) (“The literature stipulates
that transaction costs mean that the [reliance] investment is not verifiable by a court, so the parties gain nothing by
putting the optimal investment in the contract).

2

Despite its theoretical advances, the theory of incomplete contracts has yet to yield
predictions that are borne out by the realities of commercial practice. This gap between theory
and practice is due to a number of limitations in the literature. First, scholars often neglect to
weigh contracting costs, at either the front or back end, against the incentive gains that they
produce – what we refer to as the incentive bang for the contracting cost buck. Second, scholars
tend to focus on either front-end or back-end obstacles to complete contracts, and assume the
absence of friction at the other end. For example, theorists concerned about back-end
verification or uncertainty costs, assert that parties will tend to avoid vague contract terms such
as best efforts or commercial reasonableness.5 Yet, these provisions are commonplace in
commercial contracting because they save on front-end transaction costs. Indeed, the mix of
specific and vague terms can be framed as the product of a tradeoff that the parties choose
between investing in the front-end or back-end of the contracting process, based on their
particular circumstances. By reaching the optimal combination of front-end and back-end costs,
parties can minimize the aggregate contracting costs of achieving any given level of incentives.
Conversely, for any given expenditure of contracting costs, the parties can reach the highest
incentive gains by optimizing the allocation of their investment between the front and back end.
Third, contract theorists assume a highly stylized enforcement mechanism in which the
court verifies information at some cost and then orders the parties to execute the trade or not to
do so. As noted above, these scholars postulate that some contract provisions are too costly to
verify and yield excessively uncertain enforcement outcomes. When parties enter into a legally
binding contract, however, they invoke an adversarial enforcement mechanism that is governed
by an elaborate set of procedural rules. The parties bear their own evidentiary costs, and a wide
range of institutional features contain the cost of litigation so that the back-end costs are lower
than the verification costs envisaged by contract theorists. Accordingly, parties may well find it
desirable to accept these back-end costs in order to reap savings at the front-end. Moreover,
although the uncertainty in judicial fact finding might undermine contract incentives, the effect is
context-dependent and it is simply a factor to be taken into account in resolving the tradeoff.
5

See sources cited in notes 20 and 78 infra.

3

Finally, contract theorists focus on substantive contract terms and not attempts by the
parties to regulate the enforcement process. Yet, some of the rules governing litigation are
default rules that can be varied or manipulated by the parties in their ex ante contract. By doing
so, the parties can further reduce the cost of litigation and improve the ex ante incentive gains
from enforcement. This has repercussions on the choice between specific and vague terms. A
reduction in back-end enforcement costs should lead the parties to substitute more back-end for
front-end investment by replacing specific provisions with vague terms.6
In this Article, we explore the manner by which the choice between specific and vague
terms shifts investment between the front- and back-end of the contracting process, and thereby
improves efficiency.7 In designing their contract, parties choose contract terms based on the
expected mechanism of enforcement. We offer a theory of contract design that anticipates the
enforcement of contracts by adversarial litigation. Courts do not verify facts by direct
investigation, but rather rely on the self-interested evidence presented by the parties. The
enforcement of vague terms entails additional layers of evidence production. For example, a
promisor would first propose to the court the activities that constitutes “reasonable care” and
then provide evidence that she performed them. We refer to the intermediate determination as
the selection of proxies for reasonable care.8 The choice between specific terms and vague terms
thus reduces to who chooses the relevant evidentiary proxies and when they are chosen: the

6

See Christopher R. Drahozal and Keith N. Hylton, The Economics of Litigation and Arbitration: An
Application to Franchise Contracts, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 549, 550-1, 554-5 (2003)(when parties agree to be bound by
arbitration, they may prefer vague terms).
7

In a similar vein, Schwartz and Watson focus on the tradeoff between front-end investment in complex
rules and back-end investment in renegotiating simple rules after uncertainty is resolved. Alan Schwartz & Joel
Watson, The Law and Economics of Costly Contracting, 20 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 2 (2004)
8

We use the term “proxy” in this Article to describe what proceduralists refer to as “operative facts,” that
are relevant to establishing compliance with specific and vague contract terms. A specific term narrowly confines
the content of the operative facts. Indeed, in the limiting case the term directly specifies the evidentiary proxy. A
vague term (or standard) defines a broader space within which a court can select the evidentiary proxy that best
establishes compliance with the term.

4

parties at the time of contracting or the court at trial.9 To illustrate this distinction, we might
compare an obligation to deliver a widget weighing ten pounds and an obligation to deliver a
widget of merchantable quality. There are a various bits of evidence that can establish the
weight of the delivered widget in the first case. For example, compare the testimony of the
seller’s agent as to the widget’s weight immediately before delivery against the testimony of the
buyer’s agent as to its weight the day after delivery. By specifying the proxy ex ante (a widget
weighing ten pounds), the parties delegate to the court the relatively simple task of choosing
between these evidentiary bits before deciding whether to find a breach. Where the contract
requires instead a merchantable widget, the weight of the widget competes with other proxies in
establishing merchantability. In this case, the litigation process determines which proxies are
relevant and the weight to be assigned to each.
The parties choose between front- and back-end proxy determination by comparing the
informational advantage the parties may have at the time of contracting against the hindsight
advantage of determining proxies in later litigation. Damages for contract breach provide a
familiar illustration of this choice. Suppose that contracting parties wish to set damages so that
the breacher internalizes the expectation loss inflicted on the promisee. The parties have a
choice between a liquidated damages term and a broad standard of expectation damages (which
happens also to be the legal default). The parties will choose liquidated damages that are fixed
or otherwise based on fairly specific pieces of evidence, such as market prices. If the contract is
enforced instead by expectation damages, the court will invite the parties to propose proxies for
the value of the promisee’s lost expectation. Importantly, courts regularly require the parties to

9

This contrast is fairly well established in the literature on rules and standards. See generally, Carol M.
Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577 (1988)(referring to rules as “crystals” and standards
as “mud”); Louis Kaplow, Rules versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L. J. 557 (1993). Rules purport
to specify the content of an obligation ex ante, while standards leave a greater portion of the substantive provisions
to be determined after the regulated behavior (e.g. breach) has occurred and, typically, by the adjudicators of
disputes. The paradigmatic example in this literature contrasts the rule limiting the speed of automobiles to 55 mph
with the standard that requires drivers to travel at a speed no greater than is reasonable under the circumstances. In
our analysis, the distinction hinges on who chooses the proxies for “bad” driving, as well as when. In the case of the
speed-limit, the legislature chooses the speed limit rule ex ante; the judge (and/or jury) fills in the content of the
standard ex post by determining the relevance and weight assigned to available evidence.

5

present market evidence of costs and values which they then use to measure damages.10 The
court thus chooses among more or less efficient proxies for the promisee’s expected losses from
breach. Efficient proxies are those that maximize the gains in contractual incentives net of
expected litigation costs. The parties may agree to liquidated damages, therefore, because they
determine that their private information at the time of contracting is superior even to the court’s
market information ex post.
Our analysis of the tradeoff between front-end transaction costs and back-end enforcement
costs owes an intellectual debt to the work of Louis Kaplow and others who have discussed the
choice between rules and standards in legal regulation.11 Kaplow frames the choice between rules
and standards to focus on the stage at which content is given to regulation: either by promulgating
a rule before the regulated behavior occurs or in the enforcement of a standard after the behavior
occurs.12 In a very similar manner, we frame the choice between specific terms (rules) and vague
terms (standards) as the decision to give content to legal obligations either on the front-end or
back-end of the contracting process. We build on this analysis in several important respects,
however.13 First, we unpack the enforcement process to represent more accurately how the
content is injected at the back end. In particular, we treat the back end as an evidentiary process
10

See e.g., Uniform Commercial Code §2-708(1) (seller’s market damages); §2-713(1) (buyer’s market
damages); §2-723(2) (proof of market damages: “If evidence of a [market] price prevailing at the times or places
described in this Article is not readily available the price prevailing within any reasonable time before or after the
time described or at any other place which in commercial judgment or under usage of trade would serve as a
reasonable substitute for the one described may be used....”) (2003).
11

See e.g.,Kaplow, Rules versus Standards, supra note 9, [cite subsequent authors].

12

Kaplow, Rules versus Standards, supra note 9. Kaplow contrasts the costs of promulgation and of
enforcement of regulation: standards are more likely to be preferable when the former is larger and the latter is
smaller (and vice versa). Promulgation costs are larger if the regulation covers numerous heterogeneous
circumstances, so that standards are more appropriate in these cases. Kaplow also distinguishes between the timing
and complexity of regulation: they are distinct attributes in that rules or standards each can be more or less complex
in addressing discretely the different circumstances that might arise. Id.
13

There are several interesting features of Kaplow’s analysis that we set aside for purposes of this paper.
For example, he speculates that standards may be less efficient than rules (all else equal) because they impose higher
learning costs on the actors being regulated. Either they must incur the costs of predicting the distribution of
prospective outcomes in enforcement proceedings or they decide that the cost is not worth bearing so that the
regulation has diminished effect on the actors’ incentives. Id. at 581.

6

in which the court chooses proxies with which to judge whether the promisor has complied with a
vague contract obligation. Second, in the contractual context, the “promulgators” are the parties
whose behavior will be regulated. This would seem to bias the choice in the direction of rules
because the parties are better informed and have better incentives at the time of contracting than
the promulgators in Kaplow’s analysis.14 Nevertheless, we argue that there are good reasons for
the parties to let courts fill in vague terms ex post. Third, our analysis recognizes that the parties
have some discretion in choosing their mode of enforcement (e.g., arbitration or litigation) or
varying some of the rules (e.g. burdens of proof) in order to reduce enforcement costs. Their
decisions in this regard bear on the choice between rules and standards. Finally, we draw an
explicit connection between the choice between rules and standards and the complexity or
“completeness” of the contract; that is, the degree to which a contract addresses separately
different contingencies that call for different obligations.15 By efficiently choosing between
vague and specific terms, the parties can lower the cost of further completing their contract.
Indeed, by improving the cost-effectiveness of litigation, the parties can incorporate more
standards in their contract, and reduce the cost of completing their contract even further.
This Article is organized as follows. Part I examines the determinants of front-end
transaction costs and back-end enforcement costs. The choice between specific and vague terms
implicitly allocates costs between the front-end and back-end of the contracting process. We
focus primary attention on the back-end factors contributing to the direct costs of litigation and on
the effect of uncertainty and the risk of legal error on contract incentives. The rules of evidence
and procedure significantly constrain ex post litigation costs and, in some cases, may thereby
expand the opportunities for parties to trade off front end and back end costs.
Part II explores the trade-off between front-end and back-end costs, and the parties use of
specific and vague terms to lower contracting costs by assigning proxy choice either to the parties

14

Kaplow distinguishes between the timing choice and the choice between the institutional chooser
(legislator, regulator or court). Id. at 608-11.
15

Kaplow treats the complexity of regulation as distinct from the choice between rules and standards. Id
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on the front end or the court at the back. We set out a general theory of proxy choice and then
describe guidelines by which parties select the “chooser.” The parties use contractual rules to
specify proxies whose accuracy is less likely to be affected by the future state of the world, while
contractual standards delegate to the court the later choice of proxies that are more likely to be
state-contingent. The discussion then broadens the options available to the parties by observing
that they can design, with the aid of interpretation maxims, combinations of specific and vague
terms that define the “space” within which the court has discretion in proxy choice.
In Part III, we examine how parties can further enhance the benefits of trading off frontend and back-end costs by varying some of the procedural rules that will govern the enforcement
of their contract. We examine various mechanisms by which the parties tailor burdens of proof to
their circumstances. By doing so, the parties reduce enforcement costs, which thereby permits
them to achieve even greater incentive gain (or lower contracting cost) by shifting more activity
to the back end. Parties shift activity to the back end by substituting vague for specific terms, or
more generally, by expanding the proxy space available to the litigation process. Finally, we
conclude that much of contract design can be explained by anticipating the effect of the course of
litigation on contract terms. In this way, commercial parties can design contracts that better
motivate incentives to perform and at lower cost than has been previously recognized. Our
analysis calls for further research into the interaction between contract and litigation, as well as
future investigation into the effect of other back-end processes, such as arbitration, renegotiation
and settlement.

I. THE FRONT-END AND BACK-END COSTS OF CONTRACTING
Contracts scholarship identifies a wide variety of obstacles that limit the completeness of
contracts. As we will describe in greater detail, these contracting costs arise mostly from the fact
that information is costly, and they can be divided between costs incurred at the front-end and
back-end of the contracting process. We will refer to the front-end costs as transaction costs and
the back-end costs as enforcement costs. The important distinction between the front and back
8

end is that they are separated by the resolution of uncertainty. For example, the front-end is the
drafting of the contract and the back-end is litigating disputes that arise when the contract turns
out to be a losing proposition for one party and a winning one for the other. Of course, the backend may entail a number of alternative possible processes, such as settlement or renegotiation. In
this paper, however, we limit our analysis to cases in which contracts end up either fully
performed or litigated.
Parties incur contracting costs to improve the efficiency of incentives in their relationship;
particularly, the incentive to perform when it is efficient to do so, and the incentive to make
efficient investments that enhance the value of their exchange. Investment in contracting costs
can increase the completeness of the contract by providing for efficient obligations in a large
number of possible states of the world. Of course, parties would wish to minimize contracting
costs if the degree of completeness is held constant. However, the parties may wish also to
increase contracting costs if that yields a greater gain in the incentives to invest and perform
efficiently. In short, the goal is to maximize the incentive bang for the contracting cost buck.
Accordingly, the parties should continue to invest in contracting costs until the marginal cost of
further investment exceeds the marginal benefit in incentive gains. If circumstances change so as
to lower contracting costs or increase the incentive gains at the margin, the parties should increase
their investment (and vice versa). For convenience, we will refer to changes in contracting cost
per incentive bang to include both changes in cost and changes in incentive effects that stem from
incremental investments in contract completeness. Later in the paper, we suggest that by shifting
investment between the front-end and back-end of the contracting process, the parties can lower
their cost of achieving incentive gains, thereby allowing them to reach additional efficiencies in
investment and performance incentives.
Front-end (transaction) costs are relatively straightforward and well-documented in the
literature. The parties invest in foreseeing possible future contingencies, determining the efficient
obligations that should be enforced in each contingency, bargaining over the share of the
contracting surplus, and drafting the contract language that communicates their intent to the

9

court.16 Contract scholars also include in the category of transaction costs the observation that
information asymmetry between the parties at the front end may impede efficient contract terms.17
We set these obstacles aside in this paper by assuming that the parties are symmetrically
informed. This Part focuses principally on back-end transaction costs because they are less well
understood among contract theorists. The reason is that they largely stem from the process of
litigation, a distinct game played between the parties under relatively complex evidentiary and
procedural rules. Our article attempts to bring more detail and sophistication to the representation
of back-end costs. Part II then shows how the parties can manipulate the tradeoff between backend and front-end costs to improve the bang for their contracting cost buck.
Before the parties can decide how much to invest in the back-end, they must determine
the expected net value of the incentive gain that they would secure with their back-end
(enforcement) buck. This requires them to anticipate the course of their litigation and its
outcome. Contracts scholars have focused on two back-end obstacles to efficiency: (a) the
“verification” cost of enforcing contracts -- namely the cost of communicating information to the
court -- and (b) the uncertainty of enforcement. Recognizing these obstacles, scholars postulate
that parties avoid contract terms that are prohibitively costly for a court to verify or terms that are
vague.18 Their predictions are at odds with commercial contracting practice that, for instance,

16

Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089, 1092-95
(1981); Much of this transaction cost literature can be seen as a natural extension of the work of Oliver Williamson.
OLIVER WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HEIRARCHIES: ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS (1975); OLIVER
WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTION OF CAPITALISM (1985). This literature focuses on the costs of describing
or specifying ex ante all the contingencies for every possible state of nature. Owing to these costs, parties write
incomplete contracts and rely on renegotiation to specify obligations once a particular state of nature is realized.
See, e.g., Oliver Hart & John Moore, Foundations of Incomplete Contracts, 66 REV. ECON. STUD. 115 (1999); Oliver
Hart & John Moore, Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation, 56 ECONOMETRICA 755 (1988); Oliver Hart,
Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm, 4 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 119 (1988).
17

E.g., Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of
Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989); Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the
Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, 101 YALE L. J. 729 (1992);Jason Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and the Economic
Theory of Contract Default Rules, 100 YALE L. J. 615 (1990); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Steven Shavell, Information
and the Scope of Liability for Breach of Contract: The Rule of Hadley v. Baxendale, 7 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 284
(1991); Barry E. Adler, The Questionable Ascent of Hadley v. Baxendale, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1547 (1999).
18

Infra notes 20, 21 & 78.
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frequently adopts vague terms such as “best efforts” or “commercial reasonableness.”19 One
reason for this gap between theory and practice is that the scholarly conception of verification
costs is based on a highly stylized understanding of the litigation process.
A. Back-End (Enforcement) Costs
1. Direct Costs
Contract theorists identify verification costs as one of the principal obstacles to contract
completeness. They postulate that parties will not condition their contract obligations on factors
that are not verifiable (that is, where verification costs exceed a notional threshold).20 For
example, they assert that parties to an agency contract would not condition payment on effort
because effort is nonverifiable.21 In doing so, these scholars mischaracterize judicial enforcement
as an investigatory rather than adversarial process. In particular, they neglect three important

19

See, University of Missouri-Columbia, Contracting and Organizations Research Institute, CORI
Contracts Library, at http//cori.missouri.edu (last visited Feb. 25, 2005) (Total contracts in CORI database: 24,965.
Contracts with "best efforts"terms: 4,328 (17.34%); Contracts with "reasonable expenses"terms: 2,584 (10.35%);
contracts with "reasonably withheld"terms: 38 (0.0015%); contracts with "unreasonably withheld"terms: 3,525
(14.12%);contracts with "reasonable"terms: 13,281 (53.20%).
20

See e.g., OLIVER HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 37-8 N.15 (1995). Hart, one of
the leading figures in the economics of incomplete contracts, describes “verifiability” as follows:
The contract, ‘I will pay you £1 million if you make the investment I’ is not enforceable, since no
outsider knows whether it has been fulfilled. Similarly, the parties’ revenues and costs cannot be
made part of a profit- or cost- sharing agreement. The quality of [my] book is observable, in the
sense that anybody can read it... However, it would have been difficult for Oxford University Press
and me to have written a contract making my royalties a function of quality, since if a dispute
arose it would be hard for either of us to prove that the book did or did not meet some prespecified standard. (For this reason my royalties are made to depend on some (more or less)
verifiable consequences of quality, e.g., sales.) In other words, quality is not verifiable.
Id. at 37-8n.15
Hart’s description contains three examples of nonverifiability that differ in the precision, or vagueness, of
the contract term. Payment conditioned on the quality of his book is a much more vague term than one conditioned
on a specific level of investment. Profit- or cost-based payments fall in the intermediate region because they can be
interpreted in various ways by different accounting principles. Like most authors in this literature, Hart groups these
three examples and suggests that parties would contract for none of these terms. It may well be true that none of
these examples is directly verifiable, but the negative implication –that parties would not contract over this
information at all, is at best misleading. As we show below, the relationship between the cost of enforcing terms that
rely on these factors and their contribution to efficient contract incentives is far more subtle.
21

E.g., BERNARD SELANIE, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACTS ch. 7 (1999).
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features in the judicial enforcement of contracts: (a) information comes to the court by way of
self-interested and costly evidence presented by the parties, (b) the court makes its judgment
based on a relative rather than absolute assessment of its confidence in fact finding
(“preponderance of the evidence” or “balance of probabilities”), and ©) the parties have
considerable influence, either by their contract or later agreement, over the course of the future
litigation. In light of these factors, the “verifiability” of a contract obligation or contingency is
context-specific and endogenous. Moreover, verification costs are likely to be substantially lower
than economists implicitly assume, so that a contract might well try to regulate effort, for
example.
Courts do not observe facts directly, but rather they make factual determinations by
relying on proxies for the truth. The performance of a contractual obligation is proved or
disproved by the presentation of evidence rather than by the court’s direct observation. Suppose,
for example, that a contract requires delivery of a widget that is exactly .0025 inches wide. The
promisor’s compliance with even this very precise contract term is not established directly by a
court undertaking to measure the widget. Rather, compliance is proven indirectly by, for
example, expert testimony of the width of the widget – testimony that is subject to crossexamination concerning the accuracy of the expert opinion. The same is true if the contract calls
for a widget of merchantable quality. The court selects proxies for merchantable quality and then
examines the evidence to determine whether those proxies are satisfied or not. The cost of proof
therefore depends on what proxies are considered and what evidence is invoked to establish the
presence or absence of the proxies.
Significant institutional forces and incentives constrain the costs of litigation, regardless
of the substantive contract provisions. In the adversarial litigation system, the court chooses
among the self-interested evidence presented by the parties. The parties present only the evidence
that is in their respective self-interest, and the parties also bear most of the cost of their respective
evidence production. Given the evidentiary and procedural rules of litigation, each party decides
how much to invest in evidence production. They stop presenting when the marginal cost
exceeds their marginal private benefit, which is a product of the probability of winning and the
12

amount at stake. A significant decrease in the probative value of evidence, for instance, might
therefore result in a relatively inexpensive trial. Moreover, the parties’ evidentiary decisions are
interactive, in the sense that the marginal benefit of one party’s evidence is affected by the other’s
evidentiary strategy. One party’s evidence may well discourage the other party from further
investing in the litigation.22
In civil cases, such as contract disputes, courts make factual determinations with
substantially less than complete confidence in their fact finding. Indeed, unlike criminal cases in
which the facts must establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, civil disputes are decided against
a relative rather than absolute standard: the preponderance of evidence or the balance of
probabilities. Moreover, where proof is particularly difficult, trials may be abbreviated by several
well known procedural mechanisms. Even before the parties present their evidence, the court
might award summary judgment to one party if the other is unable to show that there are
genuinely contested issues of material fact.23
The fact-finding process in litigation is governed by burdens of proof and presumptions
that tend to curtail litigation costs. The burden of proof consists of two distinct burdens -- the
burden of production and the burden of persuasion – that carry distinct standards of proof. The
party with the burden of production must produce sufficient evidence such that, in the eyes of the
judge, a reasonable jury could infer the fact.24 If that party fails to carry that burden, the court
will order a directed verdict or judgment as a matter of law in favor of the other party.25 Some or
22

Avery Katz explains that an increase in one party’s evidence production may cause the other party either
to advance additional evidence or to retreat by presenting less evidence. Avery Katz, Judicial Decision Making and
Litigation Expenditure, 8 INT’L. REV. LAW & ECON. 127 (1988). See also Chris William Sanchirico, Harnessing
Adversarial Process: Proof Burdens, Affirmative Defenses, and the Complementarity Principle (Draft: February
2005).
23

Fed. R. Civ. P. §56.

24

The application of this standard appears to be a matter for the judgment of the court. A classic treatise
suggests that certain common factual groups recur and that individual judges have incentives to be consistent, and
that other courts follow to produce predictable patterns or standards. JOHN W. STRONG (ED.), MCCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE § 338 (5th ed. 1999).
25

Fed. R. Civ. P. §50(a).
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much of the cost of a full-blown trial might thereby be avoided.26 The burden of persuasion
follows if the burdens of production are met and both parties have presented all their evidence.
The court instructs the jury that one party carries the burden of persuasion and that, unless this
burden is met, the jury must return a verdict for the other party. In a civil case, such as an action
for breach of contract, the burden is satisfied if it establishes the alleged fact as more likely than
not to be true. This underscores the relative character of the adversarial process. One party’s
evidentiary production need not be any higher than that which is necessary to pass the burden
threshold, given her opponent’s evidence. At the same time, a party carrying the burden may
retreat in the face of additional evidence presented by her opponent.27
Legal presumptions shift burdens from one party to the other and, in so doing, might
further economize on litigation costs.28 Under a presumption, the satisfaction of a burden with
respect to fact A satisfies the burden of production on fact B, and it also shifts the burden to the
other party to establish the non-existence of fact B or face a directed verdict against it. For
example, when a shipper can show that it delivered goods to Carrier A in good condition and
received them from Carrier B in defective condition, there is a presumption that the damage
occurred while the goods were in the control of Carrier B.29 Such presumptions are sometimes
justified on the grounds that fact B is highly correlated with fact A or that the other party has

26

For a justification of the all-or-nothing feature of burdens of proof, see Chris William Sanchirico &
George G.Triantis, Evidence Arbitrage: The Fabrication of Evidence and the Verifiability of Contract Performance
(mimeo 2002, 2004).
27

Sanchirico, Harnessing Adversarial Process, supra note 22.

28

McCormick defines a presumption as “a standardized practice, under which certain facts are held to call
for uniform treatment with respect to their effect as proof of other facts.” MCCORMICK, supra note 24 at §342.
There is some division among courts as to the extent that the burden of persuasion (as well as the burden of proof)
shifts to the other party. Id.at §342. Some courts hold that, in this case, not only does the defendant have the burden
of production but that he has the burden of persuasion on the nonexistence of the presumed fact as well. Note that in
criminal cases there are rules that are labeled presumptions even though they do not shift the burden of production.
The Supreme Court has called these rules “permissive presumptions.” County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442
U.S. 140 (1979).
29

Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co. v. C. C. Whitnack Produce Co., 258 U.S. 369 (1922).
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superior knowledge about fact B.30
Despite these various mechanisms that curtail the evidence that is presented at trial,
litigation costs may be inefficiently high because of the litigants’ incentives. Each party’s
investment is a function not only of its probability of winning, but also the amount at stake– for
example, the damages award being sought by the plaintiff. At the time of the trial, the parties are
engaged in splitting a fixed gain or loss with little, if any, prospective efficiency value. The value
of the litigation outcome derives from its effect on ex ante incentives, which are of no interest to
the parties at the time of trial.31 The litigants continue to invest until the marginal cost of
additional evidence exceeds the marginal increase in the expected litigation outcome, rather than
in the improvement in incentives. From this perspective, the economists’ concern with
verification costs may be restated as the prospect that the parties will overinvest in litigation,
relative to the gains in ex ante incentives. Even in this more refined frame, however, the concern
with back-end costs is overstated because it ignores the ability of the court or the parties
themselves to compensate for these inefficient incentives.
Judges have self-interested motivations to take steps to abbreviate the duration and cost
of trials. A judge’s prestige and influence may well be enhanced by presiding over more rather
than fewer cases, holding her personal effort constant. And, within a case, the judge may reduce
the demands on her time and effort by limiting the amount of evidence. In light of the public
spotlight on litigation costs, some courts have enjoyed a positive reputation for putting in place

30

Id. We suggest in Part III that presumptions and shifting burdens are created by a variety of contract
provisions, including conventional contract assignment restrictions, termination rights and professional certificates
of performance. See text accompanying notes 160-74 infra.
31

See Steven Shavell, The Social versus the Private Incentive to Bring Suit in A Costly Legal System, 11 J.
LEGAL STUD. 333 (1982)(plaintiff does not internalize the litigation cost of the defendant). Conversely, high
litigation costs can undermine socially valuable incentives by discouraging the bringing of suits. STEVEN SHAVELL,
FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 397 (2004). See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the
Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1477, 1486 (1999) (discussing the possibility that parties will either underinvest
or overinvest in the search for evidence, relative to the social optimum); see also Louis Kaplow, Accuracy, NEW
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW (1998). (Parties may over or under invest “because private
benefits relate to the amount of damage payments ex post whereas social benefits may depend primarily on deterrent
effects ex ante, which are usually of no immediate concern to the parties.” Id. at 4).
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mechanisms that speed trials.32 The rules of procedure and evidence provide judges with tools for
doing so. Accordingly, they have discretion to constrain pretrial discovery, to accelerate trial
dates, to limit the length of trial, and to exclude evidence.33
Several commentators assert that rules of evidence and procedure are designed to drive a
wedge between the lower cost of evidence supporting the truth and the higher cost of inaccurate
(or fabricated) evidence.34 This improves the efficiency of litigation in several ways. First,
given this cost differential, Rubinfeld and Sappington suggest that the effort invested by each
party in litigation may be a signal of the truth.35 If effort can be observed by the court, litigation
may yield a second-best equilibrium in light of the court’s inability to directly verify the truth.
The nonperforming defendants invest nothing in litigation and are found liable, and the
32

See e.g., the so-called “rocket docket” adopted by the United States District Court in the Eastern District
of Virginia.
33

For example, Judge Posner writes that judges constrain overinvestment in evidence “not only by
curtailing pretrial discovery, setting an early trial date, and limiting the length of the trial...but also by excluding
evidence at trial under the authority of Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence....The relevance and hearsay rules
also conduce to this end.” With respect to the hearsay rule, for example, Posner observes that it is proscribed by a
cost-benefit assessment that makes exception for “those forms of hearsay that have probative value equivalent to that
of first-hand evidence (for example, a statement against interest...).” Posner, supra note 31 at 1530.
34

For example, Posner states:
In general, moreover, the party having the objectively stronger case will be able to obtain evidence
favorable to it at lower cost than the opposing party can obtain evidence favorable to itself. So the
competitive system of gathering evidence will tend to favor the party who would win in an errorfree world....[M]ost cases, civil or criminal, are resolved correctly [because]... it is usually cheaper
to obtain persuasive evidence on the side of truth.”
Posner, supra note 31 at 1492-3, 1507.
See also, Hyun Song Shin, Adversarial and Inquisitorial Procedures in Arbitration, 29 RAND. J. ECON. 378, 380
(1998); Antonio Bernardo, Eric Talley & Ivo Welch, A Theory of Legal Presumptions, 16 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 1
(2000). In Bernardo et al’s model, the marginal cost of evidence is higher for a shirking agent than for a high-effort
agent. “[T]his cost differential implies that shirking agents will rationally choose to present less evidence than their
non-shirking counterparts in equilibrium. Consequently, the litigation effort expended by the agent may be an
efficiency-enhancing signal of her type – a signal that is only possible when litigation occurs along the equilibrium
path.” Id. at 10-11;Chris William Sanchirico, Evidence Tampering, 53 DUKE L.J. 1215 (2004); Chris William
Sanchirico, Evidence, Procedure, and the Upside of Cognitive Error, 57 STAN. L. REV. 291 (2004)(cognitive
shortcomings make it more difficult to provide consistent and detailed testimony that is false than true).
35

Litigation effort by an innocent defendant should be more effective than equal expenditure by the guilty,
suggesting that the innocent defendant would spend more effort in her defense. “If this were not the case, litigation
would serve no purpose, since it would not enable the court to distinguish more accurately the innocent from the
guilty.” Daniel L. Rubinfeld & David E.M. Sappington, Efficient Awards and Standards of Proof in Judicial
Proceedings, 18 RAND J. ECON. 308 (1987).
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performing defendants spend until their private marginal benefit of investment (in reducing their
expected liability) equals the marginal cost of additional evidence. Despite judicial
pronouncements to the contrary, courts often do draw inferences in civil cases from the failure of
a party to present evidence that might exonerate them. This separation ameliorates the concern
with excessive litigation cost.
Second, if parties can reduce their evidentiary costs by performing their contractual
obligations, this saving may have an ex ante incentive effect by inducing performance.36
Therefore, contracting parties may wish to contract over factors that might entail prospectively
high litigation cost, if there is a very significant discrepancy between the evidentiary cost that
would be incurred by the performing party (who would tell the truth at trial) and that of the
nonperforming party (who would lie). The adversary’s evidentiary costs, in contrast, have no
beneficial effect on performance incentives other than by raising the likelihood of a finding of
liability.37 Nevertheless, as before, our point is simply to suggest that the focus on verification
costs alone is far too simplistic to explain contract design.
Finally, the parties themselves may further reduce litigation costs by consent. They can
do so narrowly, by stipulating facts or agreeing to limited discovery, or, more broadly, by settling
the case altogether. Indeed, the prospect of settlement provides another illustration of how the
concern with verification costs is misleading. Settlement is more likely, all other things equal, the
higher the anticipated litigation costs. For any given difference in the parties’ expectation
regarding the likely judgment, the likelihood of settlement increases with the expected aggregate
cost of trial.38
36

An agent’s “evidentiary expenditures are part of her effective litigation penalty as much as any payments
she must make to her opponent by virtue of verdict and remedy.” Sanchirico, Harnessing Adversarial Process,
supra note 22 at 11.
37

Id.

38

As Steven Shavell observes, “a mutually beneficial settlement exists as long as the plaintiff’s estimate of
the expected judgment does not exceed the defendant’s estimate by more than the sum of their costs of trial.” He
also states that “[t]he larger are the legal expenses of either party, the greater are the chances of settlement, clearly,
since the sum of legal costs will rise, and thus the greater will be the likelihood that the sum of legal costs will
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2. Uncertainty and Error Costs
In light of the various constraints on evidence production and the modest confidence
threshold for judicial fact-finding (balance of probabilities), there is uncertainty and the prospect
of judicial error in contract enforcement. Some contracts scholars argue that uncertainty
undermines performance incentives.39 Other scholars, however, suggest that the effect on
incentives depends on the nature of the uncertainty, which in turn is a function of context-specific
variables.40 In particular, the prospect of legal error is more likely to undermine incentives if the
fact-finding lies within a discrete rather than continuous set of possible alternatives. Consider a
contract that requires an agent to make a specific investment in a venture. Suppose that the
agent’s share of profits from the venture and her reputational concerns are such that her selfinterested strategy would be to invest $30, which the parties know will be suboptimal. They
agree, therefore, to a clause requiring the agent to invest $60 and impose a penalty if the agent
fails to do so. Yet, the actual investment of the agent is not verifiable: the court observes only a
noisy signal of the her investment and therefore may assess it incorrectly. Under these
conditions, if the agent’s choice is binary (she can invest either $30 or $60), then the risk of error

exceed any excess of the plaintiff’s expectation over the defendant’s expectation. One would expect legal expenses
to rise with the size of the potential judgment.” SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 31 at 403, 406. See Albert Choi
& George G. Triantis, Contractual Choice Between Arbitration and Litigation (mimeo 2004). Although outside the
scope of this paper, we would expect that the terms of a contract would differ depending on whether the parties
anticipated that disputes would be resolved by litigation or by settlement. Settlement and litigation outcomes are
likely to differ, leading to divergent incentives when the contract terms are not adjusted. Albert Choi & George
Triantis, The Effect of Settlement on Contract Design (mimeo 2005). Shavell speculates that settlement increases
deterrence by raising the likelihood of plaintiffs bringing suit. SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 31 at 412.
39

See infra note 78.

40

Gillian K. Hadfield, Judicial Competence and the Interpretation of Incomplete Contracts, 23 J. LEGAL
STUD. 159 (1994).
For the most part, competence has been treated as an either/or proposition: courts either can or
cannot verify a potential contracting variable...[But] verifiability is a matter of degree not
dichotomy; judicial competence is more or less limited because courts make errors more or less
frequently in “observing” a contract variable or translating an observation into a conclusion about
efficiency...The dichotomous verifiability approach to contract enforcement is somewhat
surprising in light of the extensive literature examining the implications of varying degrees of
imperfection in the enforcement of tort and criminal law.
Id. at 162.
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will undermine incentives by raising the possibilities that an agent investing $60 may nevertheless
be found liable (Type 1 error) and that an agent investing $30 may not (Type II error). But as
long as the probability of liability is higher if the seller breaches in fact by investing $30 than if
she invests $60, the enforcement of the obligation will improve her incentive somewhat. The
important question is whether the gain warrants the enforcement cost.
Suppose now that the contract specifies performance that lies on a continuous set of
decision points. In this case, the effect on incentives is less clear and depends on the distribution
of error.41 The risk of inaccurate assessment may ameliorate the degree of underinvestment in
effort (a good thing) or it may overshoot and cause excessive effort (which may be either a good
or a bad thing relative to the agent’s contractual incentives in the absence of the contract term
requiring additional effort). Assume again that the contract requires the agent to invest $60 and
that the agent would invest $30 in the absence of the investment clause in the contract. The
parties do not have sufficient incentive to produce evidence at trial that leads the court to pinpoint
the agent’s effort in fact (e.g., because the marginal cost of evidence rises steeply beyond some
point). This risk of legal error creates a wedge between the social and private return from
investment above $30. The social return in this case is the value created within the venture, while
the private return to the agent is the incremental reduction in expected liability caused by
additional investment. The expected liability would fall because of the lower probability that the
court would find a breach.
Unless the court declines to adjudicate this dispute, it will arrive at an assessment of the
agent’s investment. At the time the agent makes her investment decision, however, the court’s
prospective determination is a probability distribution. If the court is extremely uninformed, the
distribution may be uniform across effort levels regardless of the actual effort expended. The
agent would then enjoy no private return (in the way of lower expected liability) from increasing
her investment and it will remain at $30. If, however, the distribution is normal and peaks at the

41

Richard Craswell & John E. Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards, 2 J. L. ECON. & ORG.
279 (1986); Shavell, Private Incentive, supra note 31.
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agent’s actual level, then the agent would reduce her expected liability by moving from $30 to
$60. In fact, Craswell and Calfee demonstrate that where the variance is sufficiently low, the
agent may overinvest in order to further reduce expected liability.42 For example, by expending
$61, the agent may achieve a safety margin that reduces its expected liability by an amount that
justifies the incremental investment. Although this may be privately profitable for the agent, it
would not be jointly optimal: the extra investment is not justified by the increase in the
contracting surplus, only by the expected reduction in the agent’s liability.43 Thus, the clause
requiring the agent to invest $60 might correct the incentive of the seller to underinvest, but it
might also overshoot its target and lead to overinvestment. Some overinvestment may
nevertheless yield a reduction in efficiency losses compared to the underinvestment that would
occur in the absence of the investment clause. This improvement may justify the clause, despite
the uncertain enforcement.44
We will return to the consequences of uncertainty and legal error in our discussion of the
choice between specific and vague terms in Part II. For now, we note that the effect on incentives
is ambiguous: it may be in either direction and of varying magnitude. The impact is contextspecific, thus suggesting that contracting parties may differ in their willingness to face uncertainty
in legal enforcement.45 Moreover, there are probably measures the parties can take in their
42

Where the variance is especially high, underdeterrence is more likely. In the extreme case, the actor’s
expected liability is unaffected by his investment choice. Craswell & Calfee, supra note 41. A standard of proof
threshold is unlikely to mitigate this result because it does not help the court discriminate between complying and
noncomplying agents.
43

A more comprehensive analysis would also factor the effect on the plaintiff’s incentive to bring suit and
present evidence. For example, the extra dollar in investment may lead to more than a dollar in saving on litigation
costs because the plaintiff might not litigate or litigate with less enthusiasm.
44

This is Gillian Hadfield’s important contribution in Hadfield, supra note 40. Moreover, she demonstrates
that the agent’s cost of effort acts as a brake against the incentive to reduce expected liability by investing more
effort: to raise effort, the expected liability reduction must exceed the cost of the incremental effort. Id.
45

To be sure, a complete analysis of the effect of fact finding error needs to incorporate the incentive of the
principal to bring suit against the agent. In light of the fact that litigating parties bear their own costs, legal error can
induce the principal to bring suit against a complying agent or to hesitate to bring suit against a noncomplying agent.
Polinsky and Shavell demonstrate that plaintiffs are discouraged by the prospect that guilty defendants will not be
held liable (false negatives) and encouraged by the chance that even an innocent defendant may be found liable
(false positives). But if the principal cannot discern the actual effort level, the effect of legal error on the incentive to
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contract design to predetermine the distribution of fact finding, but that we leave that inquiry for
future research.46

B. Trade-offs Between Front-End and Back-End Costs: The Use of Vague Contract Terms
Contract scholars have a split view of vague terms, depending on their perspective. When
contracts scholarship is concerned with front-end (transaction) costs, such as the cost of
negotiating and writing contracts, vague terms serve to reduce these costs by letting the enforcing
court complete the contract.47 This argument, however, assumes costless enforcement. When
contract scholarship is concerned with back-end costs, including verification costs and
uncertainty, the authors prefer specific to vague terms. They argue that courts should refrain from
enforcing vague terms that entail prohibitively high verification costs.48 These arguments tend to

sue and, correspondingly, on the effort of the agent, is ambivalent. Mitchell A. Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Legal
Error, Litigation and the Incentive to Obey the Law, 5 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 99 (1989). In addition, as Louis Kaplow
has emphasized, the defendant’s ability to predict the court’s determination (or the plaintiff’s decision to sue) is
highly significant. The accuracy of the court, or the distribution of outcomes, affects the incentives of the agent only
to the extent that they determine the subjective distribution contemplated by the agent at the time he makes his effort
decision. At the extreme, of course, his incentives are unaffected by a contract term requiring efforts if he believes
that his true effort is hidden from the court in the sense of appearing as a flat distribution of liability across effort
levels. Louis Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic Analysis, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 307
(1994)(discussing incentives to acquire information); Louis Kaplow, A Model of the Optimal Complexity of Legal
Rules, 11 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 150 (1995).
46

Hadfield, supra note 40 at 162 (parties can anticipate and adjust for legal errors in their initial contract,
and the concern with legal error should also guide gap filling). We touch on this possibility in discussing the
contractual assignment of burdens and standards of proof, in Part III.
47

E.g., Charles Goetz and Robert Scott proposed that an informed court should interpret vague terms in
contracts with decisions that provide incentives for the parties to maximize their joint wealth. Goetz & Scott,
Relational Contracts, supra note 16 at 1108-1119; Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Default Rules for
Commercial Contracts, 19 J. Legal Stud. 597 (1990).
48

Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of Incomplete Agreements and Judicial
Strategies, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 271 (1992); Robert E. Scott, The Case for Formalism in Relational Contracts, 94 NW.
U. L. REV. 847 (2000). Alan Schwartz predicted that courts would decline to apply best efforts provisions when the
relevant facts are uncertain. “Courts passively permit the distributor to provide whatever quantity she deems best.”
Schwartz, Contracts in the Courts, supra at 304. In a sample of cases where the best efforts obligation had been
directly litigated, he found, consistent with his prediction, that the courts interpreted best efforts obligations to
generally permit a distributor “to supply any quantity of efforts greater than zero.”Id. At 302.
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set aside the front-end costs of specific provisions.
In fact, however, contracts include both specific and vague terms, and the courts seem to
actively interpret and enforce vague terms.49 Commercial contracts regularly invoke factors such
as “best efforts,” “reasonable expenses,”and “reasonable withholding of consent.”50 Not only are
explicit best efforts obligations common, they are also the subject of extended negotiations,
including negotiation over seemingly minor linguistic variations. Indeed, many contracts reflect a
highly nuanced approach to the specification of vague clauses. For example, best efforts may be
replaced by “commercially reasonable efforts,” “reasonable efforts” or “reasonable best efforts.”51
While some courts interpret best efforts as the equivalent of good faith,52 others impose a higher
standard of reasonable diligence53 and some even require the level of effort that would be exerted
by a similarly situated integrated firm.54
Contract scholarship therefore needs a theory to explain the common use of both vague

49

Kenneth A. Adams, Understanding “Best Efforts” and Its Variants (Including Drafting
Recommendations),” 50 PRAC. LAW. 11 (2004).
50

See franchise and distribution contracts cited in notes 86-919 infra; See also, CORI Contracts Library,
supra note 19.
51

Adams, supra note 49 at 12 (reviewing contracts of public companies filed with the SEC and finding
“best efforts” used 627 times, “commercially reasonable efforts” used 425 times, “reasonable best efforts” used 345
times and “reasonable efforts” used 307 times). See also the Taco Bell contract discussed at text accompanying notes
89-97 infra.
52

See e.g., Triple A Baseball Club Assocs. v. Northeastern Baseball, Inc., 832 F.2d 214, 225 (1st Cir. 1987)
(“We have been unable to find any case in which a court found...that a party acted in good faith but did not use best
efforts.”); W. Geophysical Co. of Am. v. Bolt Assocs., Inc., 584 F.2d 1164, 1171(2d Cir. 1978) (best efforts
obligation is met by “active exploitation in good faith”).
53

Kroboth v. Brent , 215 A.D. 2d 813, 814 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) (“best efforts requires more than good
faith....[It] requires that plaintiffs pursue all reasonable methods....”); See also, Coady Corp. V. Toyota Motor
Distrib., 361 F. 2d 50, 59 (1st Cir. 2004) (reasonableness); National Data Payment Systems v. Meridian Bank, 212 F.
3d 849, 854 (3d. Cir. 2000) (reasonable diligence); T.S.I. Holdings, Inc. V. Jenkins, 924 P.2d 1239, 1250 (Kan.
1996) (same).
54

Petroleum Mktg. Corp. V. Metropolitan Petroleum Corp., 151 A. 2d 616, 619 (Pa. 1959) (buyers had the
duty to “use such efforts as it would have been prudent for the [sellers] to use in their own behalf if they had owned
the receivables....”).
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and specific terms, as well as to predict when each type is more likely to be used. This paper
addresses these questions by examining the important but neglected trade-off between front-end
and back-end costs. The resolution of this trade-off in each contracting instance determines the
parties’ optimal choice between specific and vague terms. For those readers who think in terms
of indifference curves, we would draw a graph with front-end and back-end costs on each axis
and iso-incentive curves, each of which trades off the costs while maintaining the same level of
contract completeness or incentive efficiency. The point on the curve that hits the lowest 45
degree budget line is the optimal combination of front-end and back-end investments that will
achieve the incentive efficiency of the curve. Conversely, the point on the curve that hits the
lowest budget line represents the cheapest combination of front-end and back-end costs for the
curve’s incentive efficiency.
The tradeoff between front-end and back-end costs is never an all-or-nothing choice. The
parties will make some effort to describe their obligations on the front-end; indeed, the courts
require this as a precondition to an enforceable contract and will decline enforcement on account
of excessive vagueness.55 At the other extreme, it is prohibitively costly to draft a contract that
entails no back-end costs and entails no enforcement uncertainty. Therefore, it is analytically
helpful to invoke a concept that represents what is being traded between the front- and back-ends
(for example, as one moves along the iso-incentive curve described above). We draw on the fact,
mentioned earlier, that courts do not directly observe the materialization of contingencies or the
performance of obligations, but rely on evidence or proxies. Parties can constrain the space from
which these proxies may be drawn in litigation by agreeing to more or less specific terms. The
more vague the term, the broader the space, and the more work the parties leave for the back-end.
Conversely, the parties can invest in defining proxies at the front-end and identifying them
through specific terms.
Contracts essentially provide for pairs of contingencies and performance obligations– for

55

For discussion, see Robert E. Scott, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements, 103 COLUM. L.
REV. 1641 (2003).
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example, when X occurs, the promisor must pay $Y. For our expositional purposes, the parties
might define X at any of three levels.56 First, X might be the production of a specific bit of
evidence, such as a signed document or testimony by a specific witness. Second, X may be a
relatively specific event, such as the delivery of a widget with a specified weight. In this
category, the parties delegate to the court the determination of which bits of evidence are
sufficient to satisfy X and trigger the promisor’s payment obligation. Third, X may be a vague
term, such as the delivery of a widget in excellent or merchantable condition. In this category,
the court must determine not only what evidence is sufficient to establish the weight of the widget
but also the degree to which the weight is relevant in the determination of whether the standard
has been met. For convenience, we refer to this latter determination as the choice of proxy for the
vague term or standard. Although there are factual bases for choosing among proxies, the
selection is generally regarded as a question of law for the judge. In some cases, the proxy choice
becomes fixed as a legal default rule. This is the case with expectation damages, for example,
where market damages are regarded as the default mechanism for establishing the promisor’s
contractual expectancy in the case of goods or services traded in established markets.57 But in any
event, the judge cannot simply leave the standard to be specified by the jury without identifying
appropriate proxies. Thus, for example, in Empire Gas Corp. v. American Bakeries Co.,58 Judge
Posner ruled that the trial judge had failed to give appropriate instructions to the jury when he did
not specify what evidence would support a finding of bad faith, a widely used standard.59
Thus, specific and vague contract terms (or rules and standards) may be distinguished by
the manner in which proxies for a particular contingency or obligation are chosen. The parties
may either choose the proxy directly by a rule in their contract or delegate the choice to the court
56

Sanchirico & Triantis, supra note 26.

57

See e.g., Uniform Commercial Code §§ 2-703(d),(e), 2-706, 2-708(1) (seller’s market damages), and §§
2-711(a),(b), 2-712, 2-713 (buyer’s market damages) (2003).
58

840 F.2d 1333 (1988).

59

“It is not true that the law is what a jury might make out of [the obligation of good faith]. The law is the
[obligation of good faith] as interpreted. The duty of interpretation is the judge’s. Having interpreted the [obligation
of good faith] he must then convey [its] meaning, as interpreted, in words the jury can understand.” Id at 1336.
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by a contractual standard. In either case, the court determines whether the relevant proxies have
been satisfied by screening bits of evidence presented by the parties.60 If the proxy is determined
by contract, the parties incur front-end (transaction) costs to do so. If the parties agree to a vague
term (standard), they accept higher expected back-end (enforcement) costs in return for lower
front-end costs.
As an example of a court-selected proxy under a vague term, consider the familiar
contracts case of Bloor v. Falstaff Brewing Corp.61 Falstaff purchased most of the distribution
network and related assets of a brewer named Ballantine. Part of the compensation consisted of
royalty payments of $.50 per barrel of beer sold during the six years following the sale. The
parties designed this component of the sale price to reflect the value of the Ballantine distribution
assets to Falstaff.62 However, the royalty threatened to induce sub-optimal effort by Falstaff by
effectively taxing the marginal product from sales of beer.63 To deal with this problem of
underinvestment, the parties included a provision requiring Falstaff to “use its best efforts to
promote and maintain a high volume of sales.”64 When the seller sued and claimed that Falstaff
had breached its best efforts obligation, the trial judge faced the dual task of verifying whether the
defendant had breached and determining the appropriate measure of damages. Judge Brieant
chose a market proxy for the performance of best efforts: the sales of two integrated firms
(Rheingold and Schaefer) that both produced and distributed the same product and that were
roughly comparable in size and locale to the contract product.65 The integrated firms provided an
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Admittedly, this analysis somewhat oversimplifies for the purpose of exposition the distinction between
contingencies and proxies because even the narrowest proxies can be further broken down into evidentiary units.
Thus, the distinction between the two approaches (standards and rules) may more appropriately be viewed as one of
degree.
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454 F. Supp. 258 (S.D.N.Y.1978) aff’d 601 F.2d 609 (2d Cir. 1979) (Friendly, J.).
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appropriate benchmark for efficient best efforts because they did not suffer from the skewed
incentives of sharing revenues with separate organizations and because the relevant sales data was
readily available. The parties no doubt incurred litigation costs in proposing and arguing over the
appropriate proxy. Nevertheless, they avoided front-end costs by contracting for “best efforts”
instead of specifying proxies at that stage.
Other parties shift contracting costs and proxy selection to the front-end. Many
commercial contracts include explicitly benchmarks similar to the ones in Bloor v. Falstaff.66
Franchisors promote sales efforts by their franchisees by requiring them to maintain sales volume
comparable to other similarly situated franchisees or franchisor-owned outlets.67 These proxies
are established by evidentiary bits at a back-end cost that is significantly lower than if the parties
were to argue in court about the appropriate proxy.68 Thus, some contracting parties elect to incur
front-end costs in specifying proxies by contract while others leave the proxy choice to the backend process. More generally, the choice is not simply between specifying proxies or not. Rather,
contracts define a broader or narrower space within which the court selects proxies.69 The size of
the space determines the discretion over proxy choice that is assigned to the court instead of the
parties, as well as the extent to which the proxies are chosen at trial rather than the time of the
contract. Accordingly, the determination of proxy choice implicitly allocates costs between the
front-end and back-end of the contracting process. We now turn to examining more closely the
factors governing the parties’ strategies in making this allocation.
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II. THE CHOICE BETWEEN RULES AND STANDARDS IN CONTRACTS
In this Part, we explore how parties choose their mix of specific and vague contract terms
(or rules and standards) to optimize the selection of efficient evidentiary proxies over two
dimensions: when the choice of proxy is made and who makes the choice. We describe the means
by which the parties define the domain or the “space” within which the court selects proxies at
litigation. A specific term defines a very narrow space – at the limit, a single proxy. It therefore
entails larger front-end transaction costs, but lower back-end enforcement costs than a vague term
that leaves the court with a broader space. Contracts that combine rules and standards in defining
a contingency or obligation offer additional flexibility in setting boundaries for the court’s
discretion, but respond to the same tradeoff.
A. Efficient Proxies and Efficient Choosers: Rules or Standards in Contracts
1. Determinants of an Efficient Proxy.
It is helpful to briefly describe the features of an efficient proxy before turning to examine
how contracting parties would choose between contracting directly on proxies and delegating the
choice of proxies to the court. An efficient proxy contributes a larger incentive bang than its
expected cost in being litigated.70 We can illustrate this point with the following simplified
example. Suppose a seller and buyer enter into a contract for the sale of a widget that may be
produced either with an ordinary veneer or a premium polished veneer. The buyer values the
widget at $1000 with the premium veneer and $600 with the ordinary veneer. The seller’s
corresponding production cost are $700 for the premium veneer and $500 for the ordinary veneer.
Thus, the surplus from trade is $300 if the widget has a premium veneer and $100 if it does not.
The seller would produce an ordinary widget unless otherwise obligated under the contract. The
parties consider whether to contract for the premium veneer, in which case they would provide for
liquidated damages of $400, a sum equal to the expectation loss of the buyer. If the buyer would
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be confident of the seller’s performance, the parties would set a contract price of $800 for the
premium widget.
Enforcement, however, might be costly and it might be uncertain. Specifically, the
condition of the veneer might be different at trial than at the time of delivery because of the
buyer’s use of the widget. The parties are likely to offer conflicting expert testimony at
significant combined cost. To illustrate the bang for the buck concept, suppose that the parties
would invest a total of $X in litigation but that the court would thereby detect without error
whether the veneer was premium or ordinary at the time of delivery. Would it be efficient for the
parties to contract for premium veneer? The gain in surplus from the premium veneer is $200.
So, as long as X is less than $200, the term yields a net bang for the buck if the enforcement
induces the seller to perform. And it does in this example, because the incremental production
cost to the seller of premium veneer is $200, which is less than the damages liability (not to
mention the litigation costs). To incorporate a further element of uncertainty, suppose instead
that the parties invest a combined $100 in evidence, but the probability that the seller will be
found liable is 75% if she has produced an ordinary widget. As long as the probability of liability
is lower than 25% when she produces the premium widget, the seller has the incentive to perform
the contract. And, the contract achieves an incentive gain greater than its enforcement cost.

2. Determinants of an Efficient Chooser
The parties in the foregoing example have the choice between specifying the obligation to
provide premium veneer at the time of contracting or contracting for a widget of “high quality,”
or similar vague term, under the expectation that the court will require premium veneer if
appropriate in the circumstances. By assigning the proxy selection to the better chooser, the
parties can either reduce their contracting costs or improve the efficiency of the proxy, or both.
Of course, the best information as to proxy choice is held by the parties themselves after the
resolution of uncertainty. The parties have divergent private interests in the choice of proxies at
trial. In selecting a chooser, therefore, the parties have only two options: the choice of proxies
will be made either at the time of the contract by the parties who enjoy private information, or
28

after the resolution of uncertainty by the court who enjoys the benefit of hindsight. The superior
decision maker is a function of the relative incentives and information of the parties and courts;
rarely are either the parties or the court ideally situated. Barring significant asymmetries in
sophistication and information, the parties should have superior incentives at the time of
contracting; after all, they share in the benefits of efficient contracting. A court presumably has
no bias in favor of one party over another in a dispute, but it also does not have much of a stake in
the efficient ex ante outcome. As noted earlier, the court may have incentives to contain litigation
costs, but its ex post perspective is likely to weigh litigation costs against accuracy in fact finding,
rather than against ex ante efficiency.
The comparison of informational advantages is a closer call and this is what leads to the
diversity in the use of specific and vague contract terms. At any given time, the parties have
information superior to that which they can communicate to the court. Yet, as we have seen, the
selection of the proxy-chooser is between the parties at the time of the contract and the court at
the later time of litigation. The efficiency of proxies (their incentive bang and enforcement buck)
is often determined by the surrounding circumstances. Therefore, front-end proxy choice must
contemplate the operation of the proxy in various possible future states of the world either by
identifying pairs of proxies and states or by more crudely lumping states in groups. In contrast,
back-end proxy selection can be fine-tuned to the materialized state, albeit at the cost of
identifying which state has in fact occurred.71 In other words, the court has the benefit of
hindsight.
The parties may view the court’s hindsight as an advantage or disadvantage depending on
how much uncertainty has resolved by the time contract performance is due. Where the
enforcement cost of proxies varies with the materialized state of the world (for example, the
availability of a market indicator), the court has a systematic advantage. However, the incentive
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benefit of a proxy depends on whether the relevant contingencies have occurred by the time that
performance is due, not at the time of trial. Thus, if uncertainty is resolved before performance is
due, the court’s proxy-selection may be predictable so as to influence the promisor’s behavior.
Conversely, if the promisor must perform before much uncertainty has dissipated – for example,
by investing early in the relationship – then the court’s hindsight may in fact be a liability.
In sum, the parties will choose a specific proxy when the parties’ private information is
more important than the effect of contingencies on the choice of proxy. When the efficient
proxies are highly state-contingent and less dependent on private information of the parties, the
parties will be more inclined to use standards to delegate proxy choice to the courts, particularly if
uncertainty is expected to resolve itself by the time the relevant performance is due.
The case of Eastern Air Lines v. Gulf Oil Corp.72 provides an instructive example. The
parties entered into a long term contract for the sale of jet fuel at designated locations. They
wished to set a price for the jet fuel in order to allocate the risk of exogenous changes in the input
price of crude oil to Eastern Airlines and the risk of fluctuations in production cost to Gulf. They
selected a contract proxy that adjusted the contract price according to an easily verifiable
indicator of crude oil price--West Texas Sour crude “as listed...in Platts Oilgram Service.”73
Subsequently, as a result of governmental regulation following the oil crisis in the 1970s, this
proxy failed. The court declined to choose a substitute proxy. The parties might have anticipated
the failure of the indicator by stating explicitly in the contract that the price either would be
adjusted to the price of crude oil (a standard) or that it would be tied to Platt’s or “any other
appropriate index.” In general, a contract might adopt a blended strategy by providing for a
specific proxy and delegating to the court the choice of a replacement if the specific proxy should
fail. As we discuss in the next section, the inclusion of such a standard is an invitation to the court
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to choose a new proxy.74
The classic contrast to the conservative approach of the court in Eastern Air Lines is the
decision in Aluminum Co. of America v. Essex Group ,Inc.,75 where the court reformed the
parties’ price adjustment proxy in the absence of an explicit delegation by the parties. The usual
critique of this opinion is not that parties would never choose to delegate proxy choice to the
courts, but rather that there was no evidence in the contract or otherwise of the parties’ intention
to do so. Indeed, the fact that they had invested a great deal of resources up front to provide a
specific proxy might have been evidence to the contrary. Alcoa is also unique because the
contract reformation was the court’s initiative, in that neither party suggested a proxy even at the
time of trial. One party asked for enforcement, the other argued that performance was excused.76
Parties thus delegate proxy choice to the courts through the language of the standard and
its combination with the specific rules in the contract. In some cases, the parties might rely
exclusively on specific rules and forego standards. In hindsight, a court may be tempted in these
cases (perhaps with the encouragement of one of the parties) to see gaps between the discrete
rules and therefore to read into the contract implied standards, such as best efforts or commercial
reasonableness. Yet, commercial parties can include standards in their contract at relatively low
cost and they enjoy superior knowledge of the context of their contractual relationship to
determine the optimal allocation of proxy choice. The courts, therefore, are wise to interpret the
absence of vague standards in commercial contracts as instructions from the parties to abstain
from proxy choice and to limit their construction to the specific terms of the contract.77
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3. The Benefits and Costs of Uncertainty in the Enforcement of Standards.
In Part I, we identified the potential effects of uncertainty and the risk of error in fact
finding on performance incentives. Where the promisor’s decisions are binary in nature, Type I
and II errors undermine her incentives to perform. The prospect of legal error is compounded
when a court enforces a vague term instead of a specific provision because the court’s task is
broader: it must choose proxies as well as the evidentiary bits that support each proxy. Indeed,
some contract scholars indicate that specific terms should be preferred to vague terms for this
reason.78 The danger is that the promisor may exploit the uncertainty as to the correct proxy by
shirking her obligations and then proposing an alternative proxy. To the degree that the court
might adopt the promisor’s opportunistic suggestion, the vague term compromises the efficiency
of her incentives.
This concern loses sight of the nature of the adversarial enforcement process and the
consequent nature of the uncertainty in proxy selection. Both parties propose proxies to the court
and there is no compelling reason why promisors would be systematically more likely to prevail
in litigation than proxy selection at the time of contract. Moreover, the important question is not
whether vague terms are perfect, but whether there are conditions under which they are superior
to a contract with a corresponding specific obligation or even no obligation at all. Suppose that
the court has superior information at the time of trial but there is uncertainty as to which proxy it
will choose between two alternatives, such as the relevance of weight and of color to the
merchantability of a widget. Given the court’s superior information, the parties can expect that
one or both of the proxies will be less noisy under the circumstances than the one that the parties
would pick ex ante. Therefore, even when discounted by the relevant probabilities of judicial

suggested in the text, courts should view the absence of any vague standards as indicating the parties’ preference for
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choice, either alternative would improve performance incentives over a certain but inferior
specific contract proxy.79
A further virtue of delegating the proxy choice to the court via a vague standard is that
the uncertainty as to which proxy will be selected might help to reduce the incentives of
promisors to game specific rules once an adverse risk has materialized (a problem familiar to the
design of tax rules).80 The uncertainty in judicial fact finding discussed in Part I.A.2 concerned
the court’s error in determining the dollar amount of investment by the promisor, a
unidimensional variable. In contrast, vague terms are often used when the performance in
question is multi-dimensional, such as effort, and uncertainty raises different considerations in
this case. Compare the incentives of an agent faced with a specific proxy for effort (in the form
of a contract rule) and another agent whose behavior is governed by a standard of effort. The first
agent has the incentive to direct her attention to satisfying the proxy alone and ignore all other
dimensions of the desired performance.81 When faced with a standard, the agent has many
proxies that might bear probabilistically on litigation outcomes. Its optimal strategy may
therefore be to focus on effort rather than any single proxy, and thereby improve its position visa-vis all proxies.
Consider the following example offered by Canice Pendergast:
[i]t is difficult to imagine an occupation for which there are more measures of
performance [than baseball]. Despite this, it is not common for players to have
contracts where pay is directly related to specific performance measures. Part of
the reason for this is that teams are reluctant to offer a contract that rewards a
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player for home runs, say, because the player may have an incentive to hit home
runs even when it is not in the interest of the team for him to do so. By contrast,
the more common cases where players are offered explicit bonuses are for
aggregate measures of performance, such as making the All Star Team or being
the league’s Most Valuable Player. Since these are more holistic measures of
performance, they suffer less from the multi-tasking dilemma.82
The parties to such a contract are using a standard in order to delegate to a third party the
evaluation of the player’s performance. Part of the motivation is the challenge of specifying all
the relevant facets of a player’s contribution to his team. But as discussed in the excerpt above, a
distinct difficulty is the problem of specifying the desirable state-contingent proxies as they differ
among possible future states of the world. Hitting or fielding may be relatively more important
depending on the course of the season. A retrospective determination of performance can
economize on having to specify state-contingent performance measures and compensate for the
parties’ bounded rationality. Of course, the baseball contract contemplated above delegates the
proxy choice to experts in the industry.83 If experts are not available, however, one can imagine
that even a delegation to a court may be superior to the parties’ attempting to list the relevant
proxies ex ante. Moreover, the passage quoted above also suggests that aggregate measures
mitigate multi-tasking problems. Our argument is that vague standards can achieve the same
effect probabilistically, as long as the range of individual proxies are correlated with the desired
performance.
A similar, more cynical, argument may be made about the agent’s incentives under a
specific proxy.84 As an alternative to performance, an agent has the option to invest in persuading
the court that she has satisfied a specific proxy. For example, she may tamper with a testing
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mechanism or misrepresent accounting results.85 In light of opportunities to manipulate or
“manage” evidence, contractual sanctions for nonperformance might increase the incentives to
perform, but they may also raise the payoffs from investing in evidence management. Where the
cost of successfully fabricating evidence is lower than the cost of performance, the agent has the
incentive to invest in socially wasteful evidence management rather than in performance. Given
that evidence management is socially unproductive, the parties have a joint interest at the time of
contracting to deter this activity by delegating the proxy choice to a court under a vague
standard.86 If the proxy is uncertain because it is within the discretion of a future court, the
uncertainty discourages evidence management by blurring the target. The agent must discount
the benefit from evidence investment with respect to any given proxy by the probability that the
court will choose that proxy. As a result, the expected benefit from evidence management with
respect to that proxy is lower under a standard than a rule. Thus, within some margin, the agent
may be better off simply performing under the standard, given that performance is correlated with
all the possible proxies.
B. Rules-Standards Combinations
The choice between party-selected proxies (rules) and court-selected proxies (standards) is
not an exclusive binary choice based on relative informational advantages and cost-efficiency of
proxy choice. The parties can, and regularly do, include both types in their contract. The
combination of vague and specific terms is widely used in commercial contracting. One
conventional explanation for vague terms in this context is that they act as “catch-alls” that
compensate for the under-inclusiveness of specific terms. Yet, this raises the question of why
parties do not simply agree to a broad standard alone (the catch-all without the specific terms)
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that invites the court to choose the proxies invoked by the contract rules. We reframe this
explanation in terms of the efficient delegation of proxy choice. The parties may choose to give
the court a defined space within which to select proxies, but specify other proxies in contract
rules. Although specific and vague terms provide useful benchmarks for narrow and broad
spaces, the parties have the range of intermediate options to choose from. In this section, we
provide and explain various common illustrations in which the contract’s use of combinations of
specific and vague terms, that serve to guide the court’s future interpretation of the standard itself,
as well as the accompanying rules.
1. Acceleration rights in loan agreements
Loan agreements provide a useful example of an effective combination of rules with a
standard. The lender is entitled to accelerate the maturity of the loan and enforce collection of the
principal and accrued interest upon an event of default. Failure to make a scheduled payment is
an event of default, but so are the violations of covenants such as the debtor’s promise to maintain
insurance on important assets or to refrain from issuing future secured debt. In addition, many
agreements provide that the lender may accelerate if it deems itself insecure or believes in good
faith that the prospect of repayment is impaired.87 These acceleration rights are designed to
permit the lender to exit upon evidence of borrower misbehavior or a higher risk of such
misbehavior. At the same time, the parties wish to limit the ability of the lender to trigger default
for ulterior purposes: for example, to exploit higher market rates of interest by calling back and
re-lending the funds.
The parties thus find it desirable to list specific proxies for inefficient debtor behavior but
front-end costs prevent them from including a comprehensive list. So, they agree to a vague good
faith standard that would catch the residual behavior not covered by the specific covenants. Why
then do the parties not cover all suspect behavior with the insecurity standard alone? After all,
the specific concerns of the failure to insure or the issuance of more debt all fall within the scope
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of events that would impair the prospect of repayment. The reason is that the parties wish to
contain the proxy-choosing discretion of the court.
In this insecurity standard (as well as elsewhere in commercial law), “good faith” is
interpreted by the law as meaning honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial
standards of fair dealing.88 A contracts scholar concerned with enforcement costs might observe,
therefore, that a lender’s good faith belief that the prospect of repayment is impaired is not
verifiable or is too uncertain. We have observed, however, that verification costs may be less
than the incentive gains and also less than the corresponding front-end cost saving that the parties
enjoy by substituting this vague term for more specific alternatives. In particular, the parties
choose specific proxies whose appropriateness is not significantly context dependent and not a
determination that benefits from the ex post information advantage of a court. Conversely, the
parties agree to a standard when they wish to harness the benefit of a court’s hindsight and to
address the risk that the debtor will game specific events of default. The parties combine their
description of the standard with specific rules so as to define the constraints or space within
which the court can choose proxies ex post.
2. Franchisee obligations
Similar combinations of rules and standards are commonly found in franchise and
distributorship contracts. These contracts typically provide both that an agent satisfy specific
requirements and generally exercise best efforts. The Taco Bell franchise contract is a good
illustration.89 It provides that “[t]he Franchisee shall devote his or her full time, best efforts and
constant personal attention to the day to day operation of the Restaurant” and “[i]n addition, and
without limiting the generality of the foregoing... [the Franchisee shall] [d]iligently promote and
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make every reasonable effort to increase the business of the Restaurant.”90 The same section also
states that the franchisee may not have any financial stake or contractual relationship with any
similar business (a non-competition covenant).91 The agreement also requires that the manager of
the franchisee attend a training course and refresher courses offered by the franchisor, comply
with the methods, techniques and material taught at these courses, and instruct employees in the
same material. The franchisee must keep the restaurant open for the business hours specified in
the company manual.92 And, as a final illustration, the agreement requires the franchisee to
maintain and repair the restaurant, including signage and landscaping.93
The performance obligations in these franchise and distributorship agreements address
two distinct incentive problems. The first stems from the distortion in incentives caused by the
sharing of the profits of the franchise outlet. We noted this effect in our earlier discussion of the
court’s opinion in Bloor v. Falstaff Brewing. In the Taco Bell Agreement, the monthly franchise
fee is a percentage (5.5%) of gross restaurant sales.94 The franchisee must deliver annual reports
to the franchisor that are prepared in accordance with specified accounting standards and
accompanied by the signed opinion of a certified public accountant.95 The combination of a “best
efforts” standard and associated specific terms are intended to address the incentive distortion
caused by this marginal tax on receipts.
The second incentive concern addressed by best efforts is that, despite the tax on sales, the
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franchisee has an incentive to take actions that would raise its own profits but impair the value of
the Taco Bell trademark and reputation (a cost that the franchisee externalizes to the franchisor
and other franchisees). The agreement appears to address this concern within the best efforts
provision because the best efforts standard is followed by: “without limiting the generality of the
foregoing [best efforts],” the franchisee shall operate the restaurant in a clean, safe and orderly
manner, providing courteous, first-class service to the public.96 Later, the agreement provides that
the franchisee must also sell only products authorized in the company manual and it must prevent
the use of the restaurant for any immoral or illegal purpose or for any other use not expressly
authorized in the agreement or in the company manual.97
3. Force majeure and liquidated damages
Force majeure clauses typically provide that performance is excused in the event of
specific contingencies (such as war, labor strikes, supply shortages, and government regulation
that hinders performance). But these clauses also identify excusing contingencies that fall within
a vaguely stated category of factors beyond the control of the parties.98 Another common
example concerns liquidated damages clauses that provide for a calculation of damages based on
a laundry list of specific market factors together with a general reference to “any similar
valuation.” For instance, a recent gas and power supply agreement provided that liquidated
damages should be determined by comparing the contract price to the relevant market prices
either quoted by a bona fide third-party offer or which were reasonably expected to be available
in the market under a replacement contract. To ascertain the market prices of a replacement
contract, the contract permitted the promisee to consider, “among other valuations, any or all of
the settlement prices of NYMEX energy futures contracts, quotations from leading dealers in
energy and gas swap contracts and other bona fide third party offers, all adjusted for the length of
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the remaining contract term and differences in locational basis.”99
The preceding examples show how parties to commercial contracts deploy specific terms
alongside a standard. These combinations have several effects on proxy choice. The existence of
specific terms constrains the court’s choice of proxies under the standard. In addition, the
existence of the vague term affects the application of the specific contractual proxies. First,
consider the court’s choice of proxy under a mixed rules/standards contract. In the adversarial
system, the choice of proxy is likely to be a choice between the proxies offered by the litigating
parties. The court’s task is (a) to ensure that the selected proxy falls within the space
contemplated by the parties in their agreement and (b) within this space, to choose the appropriate
proxy or proxies. The former is a matter of contract interpretation and, in this task, the courts are
guided by interpretation maxims. These principles are followed with sufficient regularity that the
parties can anticipate them at the time of contracting. In the following section, we outline the
most relevant principles and then demonstrate how they are reflected in the patterns of rules and
standards in commercial contracts.

C. Maxims of Interpretation and The Scope of the Proxy Space.
As a general matter, the canons and maxims of contract interpretation do not depend on a
finding that a contract term is ambiguous. Rather, they are used both in determining what
meanings are reasonably possible as well as in choosing among divergent interpretations.100
These maxims first instruct the court to view the agreement ex ante: that is, to put itself in the
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position the parties occupied at the time of contracting,101 and to interpret provisions in light of
the purpose of the contract.102 Consistent with the notion of purposive interpretation, a contract
must be read as a whole and each part must be interpreted in light of all provisions.103
For this paper, it is useful to examine the interpretive effect of the choice of combined
rules and standards, as compared to stand-alone rules or standards. Three well-known maxims
are particularly relevant: ejusdem generis, noscitur a sociis and expressio unis est exclusio
alterius. If a contract through its exclusive use of precise terms provides only for specific
proxies, the maxims of interpretation caution the court against considering other proxies at the
time of trial. Under the expressio unis maxim, the expression in the contract of one or more things
of a class implies exclusion of all that is not expressed.104 The inference is that all omissions
should be understood as exclusions, and the specification of particular items impliedly excludes
other items relating to the same general matter.105 Moreover, when a contract provides that a thing
should be done in a certain way, it is presumed to be exclusive.106
A standard on its own gives the court a relatively large space within which to choose
proxies. Where the parties combine standards and rules that relate to the same subject matter, the
ejusdem generis canon applies, whether the general language is preceded or followed by the
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enumerated specific terms. The meaning of the general language is then limited to matters similar
in kind or classification to the enumerated specific terms.107 But the parties must be careful when
using combinations of standards and rules to use words that signal to the court a desire to have
new proxies created at trial. In a recent case, a lease contract provided that the lessor could
terminate “for good cause” and this general language was then followed by enumerated items
such as nonpayment of rent, serious or repeated damage to the premises, or the creation of
physical hazards. The appeals court held that the general phrase “for good cause” did not include
other violations of the lease, such as keeping a dog on the property.108 Contracting parties can
avoid a restrictive interpretation under the ejusdem rule by providing that the general language
includes but is not limited to the specific enumerated items that either precede or follow it.109
Under noscitur a sociis,110 the meaning of vague phrases may be determined by reference
to their relationship with other associated words and phrases. Under this maxim, the coupling of
words or phrases indicates that they should be understood in the same general sense.111 As noted
above, where the parties provide for specific proxies but no standard, expressio unis might
prevent the court from reading a general purpose. Moreover, even under noscitur a sociis, a
107
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series of specific proxies may not have enough in common to indicate to the court the general
objective that associates them. But when a broad standard is added to a listing of specific terms,
it communicates the underlying objective and helps the court interpret the specific terms in light
of the general purpose. The noscitur maxim requires that the general and the specific words must
be considered together in determining the contract’s meaning, so as to “give effect to both the
particular and the general words.”112 Thus, the general term informs the interpretation of the
specific proxies as well, and might allow the court to fine-tune a specific proxy in light of its
information advantage in hindsight.
A contract standard thus presents the court with two tasks. The first is to define the space
for proxies allowed by the standard, in light also of the specific proxies specified in rules of the
contract. This application of the interpretative maxims is a question of law.113 The second is to
choose the most appropriate proxy, or set of proxies, within that space. The court will weigh the
incentive gains from the proxy, and the verification costs. The goal, as we have previously noted,
is to find the proxy with the biggest incentive bang for verification buck. Both the bang and the
buck are likely to depend somewhat on extrinsic facts. At least with respect to evidentiary costs,
however, the judge would seem to have an advantage over the jury in comparing alternative
proxies as to verification costs.

III. HARNESSING LITIGATION BY CONTRACT
A. The Linkage Between Litigation Rules and Contract Design
In some respects, contracting parties can agree to the procedural rules that will govern the
enforcement of their contract. It is now common for parties to agree to have disputes resolved by
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arbitration rather than litigation or by the court of a specified venue.114 In many of these cases,
the parties’ ex ante agreement as to procedure improves the cost-effectiveness of their prospective
enforcement mechanism.115 In other words, the procedural provisions may increase the incentive
bang for the enforcement buck (or lower the enforcement buck per bang). The ability of the
parties to effect such improvement has further repercussions in our analysis. If the parties reduce
the back-end cost per incentive effect, they should then substitute more back-end for front-end
contracting investment. This substitution leads to further reduction in the cost per incentive
effect, and allows the parties to achieve even more efficient contract incentives. As noted above,
the parties can substitute back-end for front-end costs by including more vague terms and leaving
proxy choice to the enforcement process.
Although arbitration and venue clauses are common in contracts and widely discussed in
the literature, the fact that parties can vary the rules of litigation in their ex ante contract is
relatively unexplored. We have been hard pressed, for instance, to find scholarly treatises on
procedure or evidence that identify the set of rules that are default rather than mandatory
provisions. And, as we have already noted, contracts scholars focus principally on the substantive
terms and not on the ability of the parties to regulate the procedural course of their future
enforcement. This is a rich avenue for future research and we take a preliminary step in this Part
by examining the ways in which the parties can vary one important feature of judicial fact
finding: the allocation of burdens of proof and the standards of proof. A threshold question is
whether burdens and standards of proof are regarded as mandatory background rules or as
defaults subject to alteration by individual parties. While we have not found written authority, the
considered judgment of experts in the field is that express terms allocating burdens and standards
of proof would be enforceable by most courts.116 We do have ample evidence that many
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contracts in fact contain such provisions.117
Burdens of proof illustrate the important connection identified above between the rules
governing litigation and the rule/standard choice. When the parties delegate proxy choice to the
court, the court typically chooses among the conflicting and self-interested proxies that the parties
propose at trial. The lower the cost of resolving this dispute over competing proxies and the more
efficient the expected outcome, the more likely the parties are to use vague terms ex ante. To
illustrate, suppose that an agent such as a fast-food franchisee is bound by a vague contractual
promise not to injure the reputation of the franchise. The agent coaches little league baseball but
is also known to have a drinking problem. Each is a candidate proxy that might be selected under
the contract standard. In many (if not most) cases, the factual issues are not whether the proxy is
or is not satisfied (e.g., did the agent coach little league and drink), but rather the choice of (and
weight assigned) to the proxy. Under the default rules of litigation, a principal (or franchisor)
who seeks to prove a breach of promise by its agent typically will be allocated both the burden of
production and the burden of persuasion. Unless the principal satisfies its burden, the result will
be as if the agent's proxy were chosen because the agent will be found not to have breached its
promise. As a formal matter, the court determines the proxy, but the burden effectively assigns
the advantage to the agent by reducing her evidentiary costs and raising the likelihood that her
proxy (coaching) will be adopted over the franchisor's proxy (drinking). As we suggest below, it
may be efficient in some circumstances to place the burden on the agent, and favor the principal’s
proxy. The parties can shift the burden by contract, and thereby enhance the incentive bang for
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buck extracted from the vague reference to the protection of the franchise’s reputation.
The contrast between two classic contracts cases illustrates the significance of burden
allocation.118 Consider Raffles v. Wickelhaus119 and Frigaliment Importing v. B.N.S. International
Sales.120 In Raffles, the parties entered into a contract to buy and sell cotton. Their contract
called for the delivery of cotton by way of a ship named “Peerless” sailing from Bombay to
Liverpool, when in fact there turned out to be two ships named “Peerless” sailing from Bombay
to Liverpool within three months of each other. The buyer believed “Peerless” referred to a ship
departing Bombay in October, while the seller believed “Peerless” referred to a ship departing
Bombay in December. The defendant buyer refused to accept and pay for that cotton and the
court agreed, holding that “there was no consensus and therefore no binding contract.”121 In
Frigaliment, the buyer sued the seller for selling it “fowl” (lower grade chicken) instead of
“broiler” (higher grade chicken). The seller argued that the term “chicken” in the contract
included all types of chickens, while the plaintiff contended it meant only broiler chicken. The
court found that the meaning of “chicken” was vague and found for the seller on the grounds that
the buyer, as plaintiff, had not carried its burden of proving which of the two plausible meanings
the parties intended.122
Alan Farnsworth explains the importance of the burden allocation in both Raffles and
Frigaliment:
For the seller to prevail in a suit against the buyer [in Peerless], it would seem that
the seller would have to sustain ‘the burden’ – as the court in Frigaliment put it – of
showing that the word Peerless was used to refer to the ship that sailed in
December. This the seller did not do. But if the buyer had sued the seller, it would
seem that the buyer would have had to sustain the burden of showing that the word
118
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Peerless was used to refer to the ship that sailed in October. This presumably, the
buyer could not do. The explanation, then, for the judgment for the seller is not that
there is no contract, but that neither party can sustain the burden of showing that its
meaning should prevail.... If the buyer in Frigaliment had rejected the chickens and
the seller had sued for the price, the same court might have found for the buyer on
the ground that the seller had not sustained the burden of showing that chicken was
used in the broader sense.”123
In sum, because the buyer in Raffles had rejected the goods, the seller had the burden of
establishing that the parties had agreed to the delivery of cotton via the December “Peerless” and
was unable to do so. In Frigaliment, the buyer had the burden (of establishing a narrower
interpretation of “chicken”) because it had accepted the goods, but failed to satisfy that burden.124
The contrasting effects of burden allocation raise two questions that have yet to be addressed in
contracts scholarship. First, which is the more efficient allocation? Second, if the common law
does not provide for such efficient allocation, how might the parties themselves do so by contract?
The first question is complex and context-dependent. We set out below some of the factors that
may affect the optimal allocation in any given case, without attempting to resolve the conditions.
Indeed, we do not exclude the possibility that contracts vary procedural rules for ulterior,
inefficient purposes that favor one party over the other.125 Our contribution instead is to draw
attention to the contractual mechanisms by which parties might assign burdens in their ex ante
agreement.
B. Efficiency Considerations for Allocation of Burdens of Proof.
The nascent scholarship on the efficiency of burdens of proof falls into two groups: one is
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concerned with the cost-effectiveness of truth-finding and the other with the deterrence effect on
the primary behavior being regulated.126 The first approach examines the effect of burden
allocation on the cost of communicating information to the court. This scholarship is in the spirit
of the seminal work of Landes and Posner, who evaluated rules of procedure as devices for
minimizing the sum of the direct costs of litigation and of the costs of erroneous fact finding.127
The advantage of the adversarial system is that the process can choose between two sources of
information with different cost schedules. Bruce Hay and Kathy Spier suggest that the burden of
proof ought to be assigned to the party with superior knowledge of the facts in dispute or the party
asserting the more unusual version of the facts.128 This allocation reduces the expected evidentiary
costs of trial. In a similar vein, several authors suggest that burden allocation enhances the
informativeness of negative evidence -- the failure of a party to present evidence favorable to its
case.129 Such negative evidence is costless. However, negative evidence is also noisy when a
party might be uninformed, because the court cannot infer whether the failure to present favorable
positive evidence is due to the fact that it does not exist or simply that the party is unaware of it.
Thus, the burden should be placed on the more informed party, or the party more likely to have
access to the evidence if it is available.130 Finally, we note that the party with superior access to
information often can misrepresent the truth at lower cost than her opponent. As we observed
126
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earlier, commentators have argued that evidentiary rules pry a wedge between the costs of telling
the truth and lying. Placing the burden on the party with the best information may magnify the
effect of the wedge by forcing that party to present more evidence.
These theories, however, do not predict well the allocation of burdens in practice. For
example, plaintiffs tend to bear the burden of establishing the facts necessary to plead their case,
even though these facts are typically more accessible to the defendant. As Chris Sanchirico points
out in this respect, tort plaintiffs carry the burden of proving their defendant’s negligence, while
the defendant has the burden of proving that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent.131 Modern
discovery practices may be one explanation for the insensitivity of burdens to presumed
informational advantages. Discovery attenuates the informational advantages that one party might
have over the other. In this light, Hay and Spier suggest that the reason for placing burdens on
plaintiffs is that they typically assert the more unusual facts because people tend to comply with
the law.132 But this claim does not account for an important selection effect: the fact that the
plaintiff has decided to bear the cost of initiating a law suit, suggesting that the defendant is more
likely than average to have done wrong. Yet another theory proposes that burdens of proof follow
pleading burdens by falling on the party with the more specific allegation: for example, the
plaintiff pleads a specific type of negligence while a defendant asserts the absence of any
negligence. While that approach may justify the pleading responsibility, it does not explain the
burden of proof. Once the plaintiff has alleged the facts necessary to support its claim, the burden
of proof can fall on the defendant to show that those allegations are untrue.133
The second line of scholarly analysis of burdens focuses on the effect of burden allocation
on deterrence--in our analysis, on contract performance. Burdens affect the evidentiary strategies
and costs of plaintiffs and defendants. Each effect bears on ex ante incentives in two respects.
First, as the expected evidentiary cost of the plaintiff rises, plaintiffs are less likely to sue, all other
things equal. However, the lower incidence of litigation may lead to a string of consequences that
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complicates the analysis. The reduction in law suits may undermine the performance incentives of
the defendant, causing a rise in nonperformance and a consequent increase in the expected
recovery of plaintiffs.134 It might thereby result in an offsetting increase in the number of cases
filed, which might restore the performance incentive. The ultimate effect on incentives is unclear
and context-dependent.135
Second, the evidentiary costs of defendants have a direct impact on incentives because, like
the ultimate determination of liability, they impose a sanction. This sanction improves deterrence
(or contract performance) if the evidentiary-cost sanction on complying defendants is lower than
that on noncomplying defendants. At first blush, it may appear that the allocation of burdens does
not affect this process because burdens assigned to defendants fall indiscriminately on complying
and noncomplying actors alike. However, the following simple example suggests otherwise by
taking into account the plaintiff’s incentive to sue.136 Suppose that a principal-agent contract
requires an action that will cost the agent $100 and provides that the agent must pay liquidated
damages of $105 if she fails to perform. In order for the principal to enforce the provision, the
court must determine whether the agent performed or not. Suppose that the evidentiary cost to the
agent of proving performance is $10. The net gain to the agent from performance is $105 - $100
= $5, less whatever evidence cost the agent would have to pay to exonerate itself. If the burden is
on the principal, the principal simply will not sue if the agent performs, and the agent would enjoy
the full gain of $5 from performing. If the burden is on the agent, however, the agent would suffer
a net loss of $5 compared to nonperformance because of the $10 it would have to pay to satisfy the
evidentiary burden. Thus, the litigation burden imposes a prospective tax on the defendant agent
that discourages performance. In this example, therefore, the burden is more appropriately placed
on the principal, the potential plaintiff.137
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For the purposes of this paper, it is particularly important to note that whether the objective
is to reduce evidentiary costs or to improve contractual incentives, the effects of burden allocation
are highly context-dependent. These advantages are not very susceptible to general rules of
allocation; at best, the law can provide default allocations from which the parties may contract
away if they wish. Thus, parties may tailor burdens to accommodate their particular
circumstances. For example, the contract might shift the burden to the defendant if the defendant
has access to a key exculpatory document and if discovery is costly or imperfect in enabling the
other party to obtain the document. In a similar vein, parties who seek to use burdens to sanction
non-performance and reward performance must also be sensitive to such context-specific factors.
Harnessing burdens by contract, however, requires first an appreciation of the default rules by
which the law allocates burdens of proof.
C. The Default Rules for Allocating Burdens of Proof.
The default scheme of proof burdens allocates burdens of production and burden of proof,
and is overlaid by the operation of presumptions that shift burdens between the parties as they
present their evidence. As noted above, the default burdens of proof track the pleading burdens.
The general rule is that the pleading responsibility rests on the party who invokes the intervention
of the court to change the status quo.138 There are exceptions, however, for “affirmative
defenses”. In contract breach actions, the claim of nonperformance must be plead and proved by
the plaintiff. The plaintiff must allege and prove the making of the contract, its consideration, and
the satisfaction of all conditions precedent (whether express or implied) to the defendant’s
reciprocal obligation to perform.139 The defendant may respond that the obligation to perform has
been discharged on any of a number of substantive grounds, including novation, accord and
satisfaction, cancellation and termination, impossibility, mutual mistake, release, alteration,
merger, and the failure of a condition subsequent to performance. As affirmative defenses, all of
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these must be plead and the burden of production carried by the defendant.140 Once all the burdens
of production are met, the overall burden of persuasion, however, remains on the plaintiff. Thus,
the burdens with respect to most facts in contract breach cases – particularly performance
standards with which we are mostly concerned – fall on the plaintiff, the party who is seeking to
change the status quo.141
A doctrinal explanation of the general allocation to the plaintiff and the exception of
affirmative defenses eludes commentators.142 Courts and commentators typically offer three
justifications for what constitute affirmative defenses.143 First, the defendant may have the
comparative advantage in information production.144 Second, the defendant may be assigned the
burden with respect to a fact that is particularly unusual.145 Third, commentators sometimes
mention a category comprising defenses that are normatively disfavored, such as contributory
negligence or statutes of limitations.146 Unhappily, however, given their generality and the
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inconsistency of their application, none of these supposed policies are reliable as a working rule.147
In particular, we noted in the previous section that the comparative advantage in information
production fails to predict the allocation of burdens in practice.148 For example, in breach of
contract claims the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the defendant’s conduct constituted a
breach notwithstanding the fact that the defendant has better access to the facts in question.149
Substantive contract law often determines which party will be the plaintiff in disputes: for
example, the identity of the plaintiff may depend on the course of the parties actions. Consider § 2607(4) of the Uniform Commercial Code noted earlier. This provision assigns the burden of
proving that a delivered good does not comply with the contract to the buyer if the buyer accepts
the good. If instead the buyer simply rejects the good, the burden falls on the seller who sues for
breach of contract. This burden includes the burden of establishing facts as to the condition of the
goods upon delivery.150 The identity of the plaintiff in any dispute–and the consequent allocation
of the burden of proof– thus may rest on factors having little to do either with informational
advantages or self-interested behavior.151 In the case of an allegedly defective good, the burden
hinges on whether the plaintiff has accepted or rejected delivery. In short, the parties’ ex post
actions can affect the burdens in litigation. Consequently, the default allocation of burdens is
neither predictable at the time of contracting nor based on factors that seem to have clear
efficiency consequences. More pertinent to our project, therefore, is the ability of the parties to
determine burden allocation (and the proof standards) by their ex ante contract, to which we now
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turn.
D. Allocating Burdens and Standards of Proof by Contract
Like other commentators, we are hard pressed to rationalize the procedural rules for
burdens of proof. It is therefore not surprising that contracting parties might wish to fashion their
own. Even if the legal scheme can be justified, it is highly unlikely that it yields the efficient
burden allocation for each contract. The parties may therefore wish to clarify, reverse or fine-tune
the default allocation in their contract. We identify in this section three ways by which the parties
might do so, and provide examples from commercial practice: The first approach is by direct
allocation of burden; the second is by pre-designating who will be the plaintiff in the event of a
dispute; and the third is by the framing of substantive provisions governing, for example, the right
to assign or terminate a contract. We also observe that the parties’ flexibility extends beyond
simple binary burden allocation between the parties. They may also provide for shifting burdens
based on explicit or implied presumptions.
1. Direct Burden Allocation.
The most straightforward way for parties to reallocate burdens and/or alter the standard of
proof is for them to do so directly through an explicit term in the contract. Indemnity agreements,
for example, commonly reallocate burdens and elevate standards of proof.152 Consider the
standard indemnification agreement between DAOU Systems, Inc., and its directors and officers.
The contract provides in relevant part:
Presumptions and Effect of Certain Proceedings.
(a) Upon making a request for indemnification, Indemnitee shall be presumed to be
entitled to indemnification under this Agreement and the Company shall have the burden of
proof to overcome that presumption in reaching any contrary determination.

152

134 contracts in the CORI data base contain indemnity contracts that elevate the burden of proof from
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note 19.
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....
(b) Indemnitee shall be deemed to have acted in good faith if Indemnitee's action is based
on the records or books of account of the Company, including financial statements, or on
information supplied to Indemnitee by the officers of the Company in the course of their
duties, or on the advice of legal counsel for the Company or on information or records
given or reports made to the Company by an independent certified public accountant or by
an appraiser or other expert selected with reasonable care by the Company. In addition, the
knowledge and/or actions, or failure to act, of any director, officer, agent or employee of
the Company shall not be imputed to Indemnitee for purposes of determining the right to
indemnification under this Agreement. Whether or not the foregoing provisions of this
Section 7(b) are satisfied, it shall in any event be presumed that Indemnitee has at all times
acted in good faith and in a manner he reasonably believed to be in or not opposed to the
best interests of the Company. Anyone seeking to overcome this presumption shall have the
burden of proof and the burden of persuasion by clear and convincing evidence [emphasis
added].153
Consistent with common practice, the firm’s obligation to indemnify is discharged if the
director or officer has not acted in good faith. Litigation over this provision is likely to be brought
by the director or officer seeking indemnification. In the absence of a contract term to the
contrary, this party would carry the burden of showing that she acted throughout in good faith, by
introducing proxies supporting this claim. Yet, the DAOU Systems standard form (like most
agreements of its kind) shifts the burden to the firm, who is typically the defendant, and also
elevates the standard of proof from the default “balance of probabilities” to “clear and convincing
evidence.” It shifts the burden by way of presumption that is triggered when the agent presents the
minimal evidence that her actions were based on the company’s records or books, or on the advice
of legal counsel or on information supplied by an independent certified public accountant.
The parties had the following three options, among others, in drafting their indemnification
agreement. The agent might have enjoyed (a) a blanket entitlement to indemnification, (b) an
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entitlement conditional on a finding of good faith (without varying the default burden of proof), or
©) an entitlement conditional on good faith, together with a presumption of good faith. The first
option would protect a risk-averse agent from liability if the firm should fail, but would also
insulate the agent from bearing the cost of her negligence or self-dealing. The second option
would deter the agent from such misbehavior, but leave her open to the firm’s opportunistic claims
that she had not acted in good faith (even though untrue). Although the firm might ultimately fail
in court, the agent would bear litigation costs and the risk of legal error. As a result, she would be
reluctant to make risky decisions on behalf of the firm, even if they are profitable. This is
particularly true if the agent were to bear the burdens of proof, as she would under the default
procedure. The parties might choose between these first two options by weighing the severity of
the risk of agent and firm opportunism. If the risk of firm opportunism were relatively more
severe, the parties would omit the good faith exception.
The third option permits them to use the procedural tool of burdens and standards of proof
to reach an intermediate solution that fine-tunes the trade-off between setting efficient incentives
for each party.154 We can also see how the use of a vague term such as good faith is more likely
when the parties can manipulate procedural rules such as burdens of proof. If the parties might
have eschewed good faith when limited to the binary choice between the first two options, they
might include it if they could fine-tune with the aid of burden allocation. The example in the next
section provides another illustration where contracting over burden allocation broadens the range
of available incentive schemes.
2. Pre-Designation of Plaintiff.
Parties can harness burdens indirectly, without an explicit contract term. As an example,
consider once again a simple sales contract between buyer and seller. Recall that under §2-607(4)
of the Uniform Commercial Code, the default burden of proving whether a good is defective or not
depends on whether the buyer has accepted or rejected the good. The rejecting buyer sues the
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seller for damages and carries the burden; the seller sues the accepting buyer for the price and
carries the burden. As in the indemnification contract in the previous section, parties to a sales
contract could contract directly over which party, the seller or the buyer, would bear the burden of
proof as to the condition of the goods in all cases. As an alternative to an explicit contract term,
however, the parties can harness the efficiency benefits of burdens indirectly. Although there are
default rules defining acceptance and rejection, they may be varied by contract to implicitly assign
the burden of proof to the seller or the buyer, depending on the parties’ preferences.155 Deposits
are another mechanism by which commercial parties may structure substantive provisions to
influence the likely identity of the plaintiff.156 When the buyer has prepaid or made a deposit, the
seller has less to gain by suing for the price. Thus, the buyer is more likely to be the plaintiff
whether she has accepted or rejected the goods.
Construction contracts present a variation of this approach. Like the “good faith”
requirement of directors and officers in the indemnification contract, the default threshold for
contractor performance is also a standard, “substantial performance.”157 And, as a vague term, it
raises the prospect of high verification costs, uncertainty and opportunistic claims by either side
that undermine the efficiency of incentives. The owner may introduce evidence that apparent
defects in construction (such as noncomplying piping material) reduce her value substantially,
whether or not this is true. Conversely, the builder’s opportunistic strategy is to shirk on
performance but claim that it nevertheless complied with the standard, by offering an alternative
proxy (such as aesthetic appearance).
A construction contract typically requires the property owner to make progress payments to
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a builder during construction. An important contract design choice, therefore, is whether each
payment is made before or after the builder completes the construction to which the payment
relates. One might think of this as choosing which party gives value first -- essentially, a deposit
for each stage. As we now know, this decision determines the party who bears the burden of proof
and whose opportunistic arguments at litigation are correspondingly constrained. Assume initially
that payments are made in advance, and particularly that the final payment is made prior to the
completion of construction. This provision places the default burden on the owner (as plaintiff
suing to recover its payments) in litigation over whether the builder has substantially performed its
obligation. The burden deters opportunistic suits by the owner and might reduce litigation costs.
Yet, a reduction in the likelihood of litigation might also undermine the builder’s incentives by
enabling him to point to self-serving proxies for “substantial performance”. If this is the net effect
of the burden allocation, then the parties must trade off the litigation cost savings against the
adverse effect on performance incentives. This is a similar tradeoff to that described above in the
context of suits by corporate officers for indemnification. The parties have a procedural as well as
substantive decision variable with which they can fine-tune the balance: they can contract for the
standard of proof as well as the burden of proof. Shifting the burden to the owner is less
significant when the standard remains the preponderance of the evidence than when it is raised to
clear and convincing evidence, as in the indemnification agreement.
In sum, the contracted order of performance – whether the construction occurs before or
after the corresponding payment from the owner – determines who is more likely to be the plaintiff
and, accordingly, who will carry the burdens of proof. Given the standard of proof, the burdens
may be significant because of the relative costs they impose on the litigants and their relative
likelihood of victory. Thus, the alternative burden allocations have contrasting effects on
incentives. Yet, the simple choice of placing the burden on one party or the other is unlikely to
achieve the first-best incentives for builder performance.
In the construction contract in the famous case of Jacob & Youngs v. Kent,158 the parties
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adopted a more intricate burden-shifting solution that is common in construction contracts. Their
contract provided that final payment was due upon the issuance of the architect’s certificate.159
Effectively, this provision assigned the choice of proxy to the architect, presumably on the grounds
that she enjoys the advantage over the court of industry expertise. Like an arbitrator, the
architect’s discretion is disciplined by her reputational stake in not appearing to be biased in favor
of builders or owners. After all, she would like to be chosen in subsequent similar arrangements.
Yet, in most such contracts, the architect’s certificate operates as a presumption of substantial
performance that can be rebutted by evidence that its issuance was influenced by fraud, bias or
mistake.160
3. Framing of substantive rights: contract assignment and termination
The following set of examples differ from the foregoing in that the burden allocation
results from the manner in which substantive rights are framed. In addition, the examples are
interesting because the parties’ dispute is not simply over the division of the spoils from a
completed relationship. Rather, it occurs in the midst of a potentially on-going relationship, such
as a distributorship or franchise. This is an important difference because it complicates the
weighing of possible opportunistic behavior by each party. In the construction or indemnification
examples discussed above, the parties generally assess the relative concerns that a promisor would
shirk or the promisee would sue opportunistically. In the cases that follow (as in the earlier
example of the loan agreement), the parties are also concerned with the parties’ opportunistic
attempts to terminate or continue (or assign) the relationship for self-interested rather than efficient
reason.
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As any student of contracts knows, the contractual solution to the standard moral hazard problem in
construction cases did not work perfectly in Jacob & Youngs. The architect refused to certify that the builder had
fully complied, though the defect appeared trivial. The seeming disjunct between the size of the withheld final
payment and the nature of the noncompliance suggested possible fraud or mistake by the architect. The builder,
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the entire last payment would have been unfair, and that the parties could not have intended this result. 230 N.Y.
239, 129 N.E. 889 (1921). For a critique of the court’s opinion, see Schwartz & Scott, Contract Theory, supra note 1
at 614-16.
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a. Assignment clauses. Assignments of contract rights have mixed efficiency
consequences. On the one hand, they can move contract rights from lower to higher valued uses.
On the other hand, leaving the assignment decision to the promisor may lead to inefficient
transfers because she does not internalize the cost of the assignment to the promisee. So, for
example, franchise agreements restrict the ability of the franchisee to assign its rights under the
contract because the franchisee is interested only in maximizing the proceeds from a purchaser,
without regard to the effect of the new franchisee on the franchise’s reputation and value. Thus,
agreements do not permit assignment but, recognizing that transfers may be efficient, the contracts
also do not prohibit all transfers. Banning assignments completely would prevent the exploitation
of the franchisee’s private knowledge of higher-value franchisees. It is difficult, however, to
distinguish between the benign and malign scenarios by specific rules. So, the parties rarely
attempt to list requirements that must be met. Instead, they invoke a “reasonableness” standard
under which the franchisor’s consent to any assignment is required but will not be “unreasonably
withheld.” The reasonableness requirement is intended to have bite.161 The parties guide the
courts by combining the standard with specific rules or by explicitly stating the objective of the
standard. The Taco Bell franchise agreement, for example, states that “[t]he Franchisee
acknowledges that the purpose of the aforesaid restriction is to protect the Company’s trademarks,
service makers, trade secrets and operating procedures as well as the Company’s general, high
reputation and image, and is for the mutual benefit of the Company, the Franchisee and other
franchisees of the Company.”162 The contract further provides that “[i]n considering a request for
a transfer, the Company will consider, among other things, the qualifications, apparent ability and
credit standing of the proposed transferee as if the same were a prospective, direct franchisee of
the Company.”163
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Consider two alternative ways of framing the reasonableness condition that illustrate the
parties’ anticipation of burdens of proof. Under either alternative, litigation addresses the issue of
whether the assignment is “reasonable” and the parties present alternative proxies. The first
approach permits the franchisee to assign its rights only if reasonable. The second permits the
franchisee to assign its rights only with consent of the franchisor and provides that such consent
will not be unreasonably withheld. Commercial agreements tend to adopt the latter approach to
regulating assignments. The choice of the latter version anticipates the assignment of burdens of
proof in litigation. In the former case, the franchisor, suing for damages and to prevent the
continued use of its trademark, would be required to prove that the transfer was not reasonable.
Under the latter version, the franchisor would initially establish that it withheld consent. Then, the
burden would shift to the franchisee to show that the franchisor’s consent was unreasonably
withheld. One might speculate that this allocation may be efficient on grounds of comparative
information advantages: the person in contact with the intended transferee is likely to have better
information about the qualifications of the new franchisee.
b. Contract Termination. Explicit termination clauses are common in many different
categories of commercial contracts, including employment agreements, service contracts, merger
and acquisition agreements, loans, and franchise and distributorship arrangements.164 Their role is
puzzling because even in their absence, either party to an on-going relationship can terminate by
declaring that the other party materially breached its obligations. Under the common law of
contracts, material breach entitles the nonbreaching party to withhold performance and seek
damages for breach.165 One reason for explicit termination clauses is to provide for the conditions
that trigger termination, rather than relying on the common law requirements for material breach.
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We suggest in this section that termination clauses also tailor burden allocation. Indeed, we
present evidence that the burden design under termination rights may entail burden shifting similar
to that invoked by the provision for the architect’s certificate in construction contracts.
Consider in general terms the benign and malign reasons why a party to a long-term
contract – such as a lender, employer or franchisor – might wish to terminate the relationship. For
convenience, we refer to that party as the principal and the counterparty as the agent. First, a
principal may wish to terminate the contract because the agent failed to exert the level of effort
required in the contract (i.e. shirked) and thereby jeopardized the value of the relationship.
Shirking may be an efficient justification for termination: it both arrests a relationship that is no
longer valuable because of the dealer’s shirking and yields an ex ante discipline that might deter
shirking.166 Second, the principal may terminate because the materialization of an exogenous risk,
such as changed market conditions, has rendered the contract unprofitable to the principal (but not
to the agent). Cancellation for this reason alone would lead to the loss of the relationship’s future
value and would also undermine the contract’s allocation of risks. The principal’s incentive to
guard against exogenous risks that make its own performance more costly or that make the return
performance less valuable is undermined by its ability to escape adverse changes by terminating.167
Third, the principal may threaten termination in order to force a renegotiation of its terms so as to
secure a larger share of the contract surplus. This opportunism is an attempt to appropriate the
agent’s contract-specific investments in the on-going relationship. The prospect of renegotiation
deters the agent from investing in the relationship. As with the second reason, the principal’s
termination is opportunistic and contrary to the ex ante interests of the parties.
In light of the mixed motivations for termination, the parties might seek to regulate in their
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contract the principal’s substantive right to terminate. Depending on their assessment of the frontend and back-end costs of doing so, they would agree to a combination of vague and specific
substantive triggers for the right to terminate.168 If the parties do not address burdens of proof by
contract, either directly or indirectly, the default allocation of burdens governs and determines the
impact of the substantive conditions of termination. The plaintiff has the burden of establishing
the prima facie case and the defendant bears the burden of proving affirmative defenses. Either the
principal or the agent might be the plaintiff in litigation. For example, a manufacturer who has
terminated a distribution arrangement may seek to enjoin further use of the trademark by the dealer
and exercise its option to buy the dealer’s premises on termination. Or, the dealer may be the one
who sues in order to recover damages for unjust termination. Yet, the efficient allocation of
burdens depends on their impact on the various incentives described above and on litigation costs.
These are unlikely to be affected by whether the plaintiff is the manufacturer or the dealer. We
made the same observation earlier in connection with the effect of a buyer’s acceptance or
rejection on the burden of proving the defect or conformity in goods delivered under a sales
contract. The failure of the default burden allocation to respond to incentive effects may lead
parties to tailor burdens through an express termination provision.
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Explicit termination clauses often have graduated termination rights. At the first level, there is a right,
most often granted to both parties, to terminate the agreement without cause upon appropriate notification. In the
license agreement used by Sears Roebuck, for example, §20.1 provides for ‘No Fault Termination” under which
either party “without cost, penalty or damages for any reason whatsoever” has the right to terminate the agreement
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18. Second, the termination clause grants the parties a right to terminate immediately for any among a list of
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declaring the termination of the contract.
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Unfortunately, the parties are unlikely to be any more successful than the default scheme in
conditioning the allocation of the burden of proof on the principal’s motivation for terminating.
After all, the principal’s motivation lies at or at least near the core of the fact finding operation.
Assigning the burden of proof in the contract to the principal would deter inefficient termination
but also efficient cancellation in response to shirking by the agent. Therefore, if burden allocation
is a binary choice, the best available arrangement depends on a comparison of the prospects of
efficient and opportunistic cancellation. For example, to the extent that the agent’s incentive to
shirk is disciplined by reputational constraints, the burden of proof is more appropriately placed on
the principal. We encountered a similarly rough determination in the context of the
indemnification agreement and the construction contract. To give an example more specific to the
termination context, if the principal’s exposure to exogenous risks is small or if the agent’s
specific investment are minor, then the parties might be more likely to allocate the burden to the
agent. In any event, our main observation is that the allocation of burdens provides a procedural
lever that complements the substantive termination right.
The case of International Harvester v. Calvin 169 demonstrates how a termination clause
might yield a more complex shifting burden of proof. International Harvester concerned a longterm franchise contract for the sale of heavy duty trucks within a designated region. The contract
contained a combination of rules and standards governing the distributor’s performance under the
contract. These provisions committed the distributor, inter alia, to exercise its best efforts to
promote the sales of the manufacturer’s product, to “provide and maintain physical facilities
commensurate with the sales possibilities and service needs in the distributor’s sales area,” and to
“achieve a reasonable share of the market for the goods covered by the agreement in the normal
trade area served by the dealer’s location.”170 Two years after the contract was concluded, the
manufacturer notified the dealer that it was in violation of its obligations, including its
commitment to maintain a reasonable market share. The manufacturer warned that it would
terminate unless the dealer corrected the violations. Subsequently, the manufacturer notified the
169
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dealer that the agreement was terminated, effective in 90 days.171 A state regulatory body set aside
the termination, however, and the manufacturer sued to reverse that administrative order.
The court interpreted the termination provision to include a tailored allocation of burdens
similar to that raised by the architect’s certificate in the construction contract discussed earlier.
The court effectively treated the termination provision as if it were a delegation of proxy choice to
the manufacturer itself. The manufacturer enjoyed a presumption that the termination was justified
if it could satisfy two easy requirements at trial: to establish by simple affidavit that the dealer had
failed to comply with the reasonable market share requirement and that the manufacturer had
delivered the required termination notice.172 The burden then fell to the dealer to prove that it had
in fact complied with its contractual obligations.
As in the case of the architect’s certificate, however, the court was also receptive to claims
of process abuse. The dealer could avoid the burden of proving compliance by showing that the
manufacturer had an ulterior motive in terminating: for example, that the manufacturer sought to
install another dealership in the adjoining county. Indeed, in International Harvester, the dealer
had filed a formal protest with the agency charged with jurisdiction over claims of unfair treatment
of dealers. Only then, the dealer contended, did the manufacturer’s evaluations of the dealer’s
sales performance begin to deteriorate. The dealer also testified that the manufacturer attempted to
coerce the dealer to expand its facilities and greatly increase its investment in inventory and fixed
costs. The notice of termination, the dealer argued, was the result of its reasonable refusal to
comply with these demands. The court held that this prima facie showing of bad faith shifted the
burden to the manufacturer to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the termination was
not motivated by strategic considerations – that it would have terminated even in the absence of
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the alleged bad faith purpose.173
This example of shifting burdens (or presumptions) suggests that the parties have more
flexibility in burden design than all-or-nothing allocations to each party. The court in
International Harvester adapted the scheme of presumptions and shifting burdens from civil rights
case law.174 Yet, we should not miss the important lesson for contract design. The discussion
underscores the importance, but also the complexity, of the contracting task of efficient burden
assignment, whether by explicit or implicit provisions. On the one hand, the parties must identify
and evaluate the relative severity of the agent’s incentives to shirk and the principal’s incentives to
make opportunistic claims of breach, both in terms of their likelihood and their efficiency
consequences. On the other hand, the parties must anticipate the future litigation, particularly,
who is more likely to be suing and for what. Although the parties can undoubtedly improve on the
default burden allocations, the tailoring task is likely to involve substantial up-front transaction
costs.
CONCLUSION
In this Article, we analyze the relationship between the front-end and back-end stages of
contracting by examining (1) the choice between specific and vague terms and (2) the interaction
between substantive and procedural contract provisions. We offer a preliminary theory explaining
the feedback effect of the adversarial litigation system –and especially the process of proxy
selection and proof-- on contract terms. In doing so, we hope to set a research agenda for further
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integrating the litigation mechanism with the theory of contract design. Much can be gained by a
sharing of knowledge and insights between procedure and contracts scholars and, in the world of
practice, between litigators and transaction lawyers. Indeed, contract design can anticipate not
only the effect of litigation, but also other possible back-end processes, such as arbitration,
renegotiation or settlement.
We conclude that commercial parties can (and do) design contracts that motivate better
contractual performance incentives and at lower cost than has been previously understood. By
examining how contracts can harness the litigation process, we breathe new life into the scholarly
acceptance of vague terms by rebutting a persistent skepticism in contract scholarship about their
cost-effectiveness. Vague terms can be valuable by deferring proxy selection to the enforcement
stage, particularly when the parties can also improve the efficiency of litigation by, for example,
manipulating the assignment of burdens of proof. The use of deposits or termination rights in
combination with vague terms illustrates this strategy.
The claim that party-created standards can enhance efficiency in harnessing the ex post
informational advantage available at litigation does not justify the promulgation by legislatures or
courts of default standards instead of default rules.175 After all, the cost to the parties of writing
such vague terms is low. Moreover, we have shown that standards such as “reasonableness” or
“best efforts” are rarely invoked in isolation. The combinations of rules and standards that we
have examined reveal a complex contractual design that public law makers are often unable fully
to comprehend. Thus, there are several normative implications that might be drawn from the
analysis. First, parties are better able to write constrained efficient contracts that optimize resource
expenditures and incentive gains than has generally been believed. Therefore, the justification for
filling gaps in incomplete contracts with legally supplied default terms is weakened. Second, the
task of combining rules and standards is both complex and context-specific. Therefore, the courts
would be wise to interpret the absence of vague terms or standards in commercial contracts as
instructions from the parties to limit their construction to the specific terms of the contract.
175

Cf. Ayres, supra note 71 at 1405-6.
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